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MAINE'S "ACT TO PROTECT TRADITIONAL
MARRIAGE AND PROHIBIT SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES": QUESTIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER STATE AND
FEDERAL LAW
Jennifer Wriggins*
"Let me not to thw marriage of true minds Admit impediments..."'
Marriage "is the most important transaction of We. The happiness
of those who assume its ies usually depends upon it more than upon
anything else. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Maine's Legislature passed "An Act to Protect Traditional
Marriage and Prohibit Same-Sex Marriages" (Act).3 The summary
attached to the bill states that the bill prohibits persons of the same sex
from contracting marriage."4 The bill was the verbatim text of an
initiative petition The petition was one of a number of measures
presented in various states in response to the Hawaii Supreme Court's
1993 decision in Baehr v. Lewin. 6 Maine was the only New England
* Associate Professor of Law. Unh tyf Maine School of Law BA Ya.e Col!e; J.D.,
Harvard Law School
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1. William Shakespeare. Sonnet CXVL
2. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 129 Me. 24,26,149 A.2d 572, 573 (Me. 1930).
3. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ti. 19-A, §§ 650 & 701(1-A). (5) (West 1998).
4. LD. 1017 (118th Legis. 1997).
5. Me.Const.art, pL3,§ 18. Under the Maine Constitution, w innminitativepeton
has sufficient signatures and the legislature deficts or changes it, it shall go out to refer edum. If
the legislature passes it, it shall not go out to referendum. See id. The petition vas circulated by
Concerned Maine Families, a group that earlier sponsored a ballot initiative that wauld have
provided that the Maine Human Rights Act could not be amended to outlaw disriminaich oa the
basis of sexual orientation oron otfer bases. That measure w defeated by the voters in November
1995. See Steven G. Vegh, Same-Sex Marriage Ban En Route to Legislatrre Conc ed Maine
FamilieGets the Signatures to Advance ts Initiative, PORuAND PREss HstAID, Feb. 8,1997, at
Al.
6. The Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
modled by 852 P.2d 74 (Haw. 1993). held that the state's ban on age by sam.ged:r couples
had to bejustified by a compelling stat interest in order to be constitutionaL See id. at 67. Thr
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state to pass such a provision. Although couples of the same gender for
over twenty-five years have been asserting the right to legally marry,7
Baehr v. Lewin for the first time presented the strong possibility that
restrictions on marriage by same-gender couples would be struck down
under a state constitution." This in turn presented the possibility that
couples of the same gender would legally marry in Hawaii and then
move or travel to other states. The Hawaii Supreme Court's final
decision on the issue is expected at any time. Cases about whether a
state can constitutionally forbid couples of the same gender from
marrying also are pending before the Vermont Supreme Court,9 and in
New York.1" In February 1998, an Alaska Superior Court judge held
that the right to choose one's life partner is fundamental under the state's
constitution."
Civil marriage in Maine and other states is regulated by state statute,
12
and marriage regulation is generally considered to be within the state's
police power. 3 However, the state's power to regulate marriage is
subject to constitutional limitations.
1 4
same-gender marriage ban was held to be a classification based on gender and subject to strict
scrutiny under the state constitution. See idL On remand, the trial court indeed found that
restrictions on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. See Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394,
1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The case is currently on appeal to the
Hawai Supreme Court. For other states' statutes regarding same-sex marriage, see Appendix: State
Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Statutes, 16 QUINNIAC L REV. 134 (Spring & Summer 1996). Bills
outlawing marriages by same-gender couples were defeated in a number of states. Andrew
Koppelman, Same-sex Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPAC
L. REV. 105, 106 & n.2 (1996). Several Governors vetoed bills. See Ban Against Gay Unions
Draws Veto, PoRTLAND PREss HERA , Mar. 26, 1996, at A4 (referring to veto by Governor Roy
Romer of Colorado); Let Maine Tell World:" We Won't Discriminate, Same-Gender Marriage Isn't
Even an I=e in Maine, MAINE SUNDAY TEmm Feb. 23,1997, at C4 (referring to Washington
Governor Gary Locke's veto of a law banning marriage by same-gender couples).
7. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (stating that marriage by
same-gender couples is not marriage).
8. See supra note 6.
9. See Bakerv. Vermont, No. S1009-97 (Vt. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 1997), appeal docketed,
No. 98-32 (Vt. Jan. 15,1998).
10. Stors v. Holcomb, 666 N.YS.2d 835 (1997), refiled as Storrs v. Holcomb, No. 98-164
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 1998).
11. See Brausev. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-0562 C, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27,1998) (holding that because the right to choose one's life partner is fundamental,
a ban on marriage by couples of same gender must be justified by a compelling state interest in
order to be constitutional under the state constitution). This case is currently on appeal.
12. See Herksenv. Camon,622 A.2d 1135,1145 (Me. 1993) (Glassman, J., dissenting).
For example, Maine does not recognize common law marriages. See Pierce v. Secretary of U.S.
Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 254 A.2d 46,48 (Me. 1969).
13. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190
(1888)).
14. See id, at 7. No published constitutional challenges to Maine's marriage laws have been
decided.
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Many lesbians and gay men are in committed, long-term couple re-
lationships"5 and many would marry if they could."6 Gay couples may
wish to marry for the same variety of reasons that heterosexual couples
wish to marry: to declare their commitment and love; to reflect that their
economic, social, and family lives are intertwined; and to obtain the
legal responsibilities and protection for their families that civil marriage
provides.
7
Maine's Act is unique among those passed in the wake of Baehr.
Like many other state statutes, its practical effect is to ban same-gender
marriage from taking place in Maine and to forbid recognition in Maine
of same-gender marriages which may take place legally outside Maine.'s
At the same time, one of its stated purposes is "[t]o support and streng-
then traditional monogamous Maine families against improper interfer-
ence from out-of-state influences or edicts."' 9 This goal of protecting
Maine citizens from out-of-state influences is not found in any other
state's anti-same-gender marriage laws published in a recent compila-
tion?' Maine's Act is also unique in that the stated "Tindings" attempt
to control the deference courts should give the statute, through the mech-
anism of declaring certain things to be "compelling [state] interests."2'
15. See ethKaiman, Embracing Gay Couple, Tow'n Defies Strweopes, ADE SUNDAY
TEGRA, Apr. 7, 1996, at Al; see also Shoshana Hoose, Growing Number of Goys Support
Marriage Rights, MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAK Oct. 13.1996, at Al; David Foser, To Have and
Hold. They're Just Another Married Couple, Except for One Detail: Their Union Isn't Legal,
MAINSuNDAYTELEGRA June 2, 1996, at Cl; David L Chambers, What If. The Legal Conse-
qu ces ofMarriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Couples. 95 MIL L REV. 447. 449
(1996). For example, in one study, 25% of the 560 gay male couples studied and 14% of the 706
lesbian couples studied had lived together for ten or more years. See A. StceveBqant and Demian,
Relationship Characteristics of Gay and Lesbian Couples: Findings from a National Survey
<demian@buddyouddy.com> (an academic presentation of key findings from this survey also
appears in 1(2) . of Gay & Lebian Social Services (1994)); see also Lawrence A. Kurd Pk, Lesbian
and Gay Couples, in IESIAN, GAY, AND BISEXAL IDENTf=E OVER THE LEMAN 243, 243
(Anthony R. D'Augelli & Charlotte J. Patterson eds., 1995) (noting survey results that between 45
and 80% of lesbians and between 40 and 60% of gay men art currently involved in a romantic
relationship).
16. See Wai.AMmES mGE, THECASEFORSAME-EM IAG FtoMI SEXUAL LMERTY
TO CWU= COMM Nr 1-4 (1996) herinafter THE CAS FOR SAIE-S=X MARRIAGE];
Chambers, supra note 15, at450 n.7.
17. See ihfta Part ILA.
18. See MF REV. SrAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(1-A), (5) (West 1998); Appendix: State Ani-
Same-Sex Marriage Statutes, supra note 6.
19. ML.REV.STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650(2XC) (West 1998). See infra Part V.F.3.C.
20. See Appendix State Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Statutes, supra note 6. The only state
where the legislature appears to have made any comparable statement is Louisiana, w the
legislature passed aconcurrentresol.tion (eferencing the Hawaii case and the concern that the full
faith and eredit clause of thefederal constitution might affect marriage laws throughout the United
States) and at the same time passed a law banning marniage by same-geder couples. See I&
21. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650(IX4CWest 1998). "Tlhe State has a compelling
interest to nurture and promote the unique institution of traditional monogamous marriage in the
support of harmonious families and the physical and mental health of children; and... the Ste
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In additionj the stated "purposes" language concerning marriage and the
family is remarkably and uniquely broad and vaguer'
Maine's Act has two main operational provisions. First, it forbids
marriages by persons of the same gender and provides that if such
marriages are performed in Maine, they are void. 2 Second, it provides
that same-gender marriages legally performed in other states are void in
Maine.' In addition, it contains various "findings and purposes." This
article argues that both operational provisions are unconstitutional under
the Maine and Federal Constitutions 6 as a violation of equal protection
and anti-discrimination principles2  and as a denial of fundamental
rights.' Also, there are strong additional arguments that the second
operative provision, which refuses recognition of legal out-of-state
marriages,2 is violative of federal constitutional principles such as full
faith and credit, the right of out-of-state people to marry, and the right
to travel? These issues, as well as the related issue of the constitution
has the compelling interest in promoting the moral values inherent in traditional monogamous
marriage." Id.
22. For example, "the purposes of this chapter are: A. To nurture, sustain and protect the
traditional monogamous family unit in Maine society, its moral imperatives, its economic function
and its unique contribution to the rearing of healthy children .... " Id.
23. See id. § 701(5) ("persons of the same sex may not contract marriage").
24. See id, § 701(1-A) ("Any marriage performed in another state that would violate any
provisions of [§ 701] subsections 2 to 5 [prohibiting marriages defined as polygamous, within
certain degrees of consanguinity, by persons under a mental disability, and persons of the same
gender] if performed in this State is not recognized in this State and is considered void if the parties
take up residence in this State.").
25. See id. §650. ThesearesetforthinfullatPartlLC.
26. In the past twenty years, state supreme courts have become increasingly active in
deciding state constitutional issues. See, e.g., JENNoE FkWESE, STATE CONSTITrTIONAL LAW:
LrIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIG.S, CLiANS D DEFENSES 2-4 (2d ed. 1996). Relatively few cases
have interpreted Maine's Constitution, but the Maine Constitution has an existence independent of
the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Cadman. 476 A.2d 1148 (Me. 1984); Marshall J.
TI'mkle, The Resurgence of State Constitutional Law, 18 ME. B. BULL 257 (1984); Symposium.
Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 50 1EW. L REV. 3 (1997).
27. See infra Parts V.B, Vi). & VE.
28. See infra Parts V.C. & VE.
29. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 701 (I-A) (West 1998).
30. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law: If We Many in
Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home? 1994 WIS. L REV. 1033 (1994); Larry
Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception,
106 YALE LJ. 1965 (May 1997); Melissa Rothstein, The Defense of Marriage Act and Federalism:
A States' Rights Argument in Defense of Same-sex Marriages, 31 FAM. LQ. 571 (1997); Scott
Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97
CounvL L REv. 1435 (1997); Mk& Strasser, Loving the Romer out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense
of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U. Prrr. L REV. 279 (1997); Beth A. Allen, Comment, Same-
Sex Marriage: A Conflict-of-Laws Analysisfor Oregon, 32 WILLAMETIEL REV. 619 (1996); Julie
L.B. Johnson, Comment, The Meaning of "General Laws": The Extent of Congress's Power Under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U.
PA. L REV. 1611 (1997); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice
ofLaw Argumentsfor Recognition of Sane-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L REV. 499 (1995); Barbam
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ality of the Defense of Marriage Act,31 .are beyond the scope of this
Article but have been explored by others.'
Marriage has never had a fixed meaning, and constantly evolves over
time, reflecting societal changes and needs.' Several examples from
Maine cases illustrate this point Interracial marriages in Maine in the
past were not considered marriages. In Bailey v. Fiske, ' the Maine Law
Court determined that a fifty-nine year marriage deemed to be between
people of different races was void because it violated the applicable
miscegenation statute,' thus, an essential feature of marriage used to be
the racial characteristics of the participants. In addition, differential
treatment of married men and women used to be a critical element of
marriage. For example, it used to be a central feature of marriage that
wives in Maine could not hold property or sign contracts. In fact, wives
had no legal existence separate from their husbands until nineteenth-
century legal reforms.' Important gender-based elements of marriage
persisted until rather recently. Before the Law Court's 1978 decision in
Beal v. Beal,' only women could get alimony if a marriage ended?
Damages for loss of consortium used to be available to a husband'if his
wife was injured, but not to a wife if her husband was injured because
A. Robb, Note, The Consfttionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake of Romar v.
Evans, 32 NEwENG. L REV. 263 (1997); Germaine Winnick Willett, Note, EquaM7 Under P Law
or Annihilation of Mariage and Morals? The Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 73 LIM. J. 355 (1997).
31. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified in 1 U.S.C. § 7.28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
32. See authorities cited supra note 30.
33. See Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d. 44.63 (Haw. 1993). Important historical woks dealing
with changes in marriage and family law include: MICUL GROSSEERG, GOV MGur M HEAR H
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NNEEEH CENTURY AMERICA (1985); IAWRE cE SONE, ROAD TO
DntOPm-ENGLAND 1530-1987 (1990); MARY ANN (uErO,4, "rTRANSbORMAION OFFA.MUY
LAW: STATE, LAW AND FAMILY INTIE UNITED STATES AND WESERN EUROPE (1989).
34. 34 Me. 77 (1852).
35. See it at 78. The Bailey court was applying the Massachusetts mis cnation statute
since the parties were manied when Maine was part of Massachuse. Thz Massachusetts Act of
1786 fobade the marriage of a white person with any"negro, Indian, or mulatto." 176 IMs. A.cts
oh. 3, § 7. This Act, which was amended in 1810, governed the dissolution of the marriage
relationship in Maine until 1820. See Henrilksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1145 (Me. 1993)
(Glassman, J., dissenting). In 1821, one year after Maine became a statre it passed its o--
miscegenation statute. See Title 5, ch. 59 § 2 (1821) (rNo white person shall intemuany with a
negro, Indian or mulatto; and no insane person or idiot shall be capable of contracting marriage.").
This statute was repealed in 1883. The Massachusetts law was repealed in 1843.
36. See, e.g., Haggett v. Hudey, 40 A. 561 (Me. 1891) (holding that despite changes in th
common law removing disabilities of married women, the wife could not form a busi
partnership with husband). The Haggen court noted that, "[b]efore the reent statutes it had been
for more than a thousand years the settled legal policy of the Teutonic nations, at least, to exclude
a married woman from all participation in business affairs"). Id. at 563; see abso Robinson
(appellant of probate decree), 88 Me. 17,22-23,33 A. 652.654-55 (1895).
37- 388 A.2d 72 (1978).
38. See id, at 73-74.
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a husband, unlike a wife, was entitled to spousal services.39 Husbands,
but not wives, used to have primary liablity for supporting their
children.' Interspousal immunity used to be an essential element of
marriage.4 The Law Court recognized in a series of decisions in the
1970s.' 1980s,43 and 1990se4 that this no longer was an essential element
of marriage.45 Marriage is a resilient, ever-changing institution, defined
by human beings.4'
39. See Allen v. Rossi, 128 Me. 201,204, 146 A. 692, 693 (1929) (explaining that loss of
consortium is a property right of the husband in the assistance, society, and comfort of his wife);
see also Paul Benjamin iUnton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making a Difference or Making
a Statement?, 70 TEMP. L REv. 907, 932 (1997). Title 19, section 167-A of the Maine Revised
Statutes provided that "[a] married woman may bring a civil action in her own name for loss of
consortium of her husband." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 167-A (West 1981) (repealed 1995).
This law was passed in 1967 in order to change the common law and make each spouse able to file
for loss of consortium damages. The legislature made the law gender-neutral in 1995. It now states
that "[a] married person may bring a civil action in that person's own name for loss of consortium
ofthat person's spouse" ME. REV. SAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 302 (West 1997). However, at common
law, husbands were allowed to bring a civil action for loss of consortium. See, e.g., Brittonv. Dube,
154 Me. 319, 147 A.2d 452 (Me. 1958).
40. See Pendexterv. Pendexter,363 A.2d743,746 (M. 1976); cf. id at750 (Defisne, CJ.,
concurring in result) (noting that the old common law rule that the father is primarily responsible
for the support of children is outmoded and should be discarded).
41. See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304,306 (177) (holding that husband and wife ae one
person and, therefore, cannot sue each other and dismissing the wife's suit alleging that her husband
had kidnapped her and had her confined in a mental institution).
42. See Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224, 228 (Me. 1973) (holding that interspousal
immunity did not bar an action for conduct before marriage but did bar an action for conduct during
marriage).
43. See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 75 & n.5 (Me. 1980) (holding that
interspousal immunity was abrogated in a motor vehicle case, but that the nature of a special marital
relationship may necessitate immunity in some cases).
44. See Henr ksen v. Cameron, 622A.2d 1135, 1140(Me. 1993) (holdingthatanactionfor
"the intentional infliction of emotional distress through violence and accompanying verbal abuse
during the marriage" was not barred by interspousal immunity).
45. In MacDonald, the Maine Law Court wrote that by recognizing change,
we do not undermine the principle of stare decisis. Rather, we prevent it from defeating
itself, we do not permit it to mandate the mockery of reality and the "cultural lag of
unfainess and injustice," which would arise if thejudges of the present, who like their
predecessors cannot avoid acting when called upon, were requried to act as captives of
the judges of the past, restrained without power to break even those bonds so withered
by the changes of time that at the slightest touch they would crumble.
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d at 74 (quoting Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d at 228); see
also Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987,998 (Me. 1982) (noting that where common law rule produces
undesirable results, judges have responsibility to change); Pendexter v. Pendexter, 363 A.2d at 748-
49 (Dufresne, CJ, concurring in result) (maintaining that "where the reason for the rule ... no
longer exists, the rule itself should cease").
46. Family law in the United States, including marriage law, is civil, rather than religious
law. As Professor Lawrence M. Friedman, perhaps the leading historian of United States legal
history, notes, "iln England, ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, and
the church had an important role in fanily law. The United States had no such court, and, after the
early 19th century, no established churches. Family law was thoroughly secular in the United
States." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202 (1985).
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Considerable evidence has emerged that marriages by same-gender
couples have been recognized in various societies and historical
periods The societal meaning of marriage has been changing in the
United States. In addition, a number of industrialized nations in the
past ten years have enacted legislation recognizing same-sex relation-
ships, or are considering such legislation; there is, in fact, a worldwide
movement seeking recognition of marriages of same-gender couples 9
The economic, societal, and emotional functions of marriage in the
United States have changed drastically in the last hundred and fifty
years. In the past, the economic and procreative aspects were critically
important; now, the emotional aspects are seen as central to its
meaning ° The primacy of the emotional aspects of marriage casts
doubt on justifications for limiting it to persons of the opposite sex.
This Article will proceed in the following manner. First, I will review
the Act and the legal ramifications of preventing persons of the same
gender from marrying. Second, I will briefly introduce the applicable
constitutional theories under both federal and state law. I will discuss
in some detail the equal protection, civil rights, and nondiscrimination
provisions of the Maine Constitution contained in Article I, section 6-A.
Third, I will apply these theories to the Act. I maintain that "heightened
scrutiny"5' should be applied to the Act because the Act creates a
gender-based classification, burdens fundamental rights,' and
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation. The Act would not
survive heightened scrutiny5 In addition, if the less exacting "rational
basis scrutiny" test is applied to the Act, it would not survive that
scrutiny either, particularly applying the ideas contained in Romer v.
47. See, e-g.,JOHNBoswEu. SAME- EUNIoNs N PREMODERN EUROPE (1994); WilXiam
N. Eskridge, Jr., A Hitory of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L REV. 1419 (1993).
48. For example, several churches, including the Unitarian Uni alist and the Unh-ersal
Felowship ofMetropolitan Community Clurches, have celebrated thousand ofmiames bysame-
sex couples. See EsKtnGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARIAGEF, urzpmz note 16, at 193-97
(containing excespts of letters written by the Reend Elder Troy D. Perry and the Revrad Scott
W. Alexader to the Hon. Shellie Bower).
49. See, e.g.,EJ. Graf, The Inevitability ofSame-SexMarriage, BOSON GLOBa., Feb. 12,
1998, at A27; Doug Ieland, Rene=be ingHerre: Defense f MarriageAct, THE NAInON. Jun: 24.
1996 at 6; ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 49-50.
50. See GLENDON, supra note 33, at 292-93; see also EmaiDG, supra note 16, at 96-98,
129-30; MARY ANN GENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AD THE NEW PROPERTY, 12-13 (1981); see
generally EJ. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAE FOR? (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with
Author).
51. See discussion hfra Part V. There ar seral forms of heightened scrutiny. Sec note
261 for an abbreviated description of the types discussed in this Article; sce parts V.B-VD for a
more detailed discussion.
52. See discussion ifra Part V.B.
53. See discussion ifta Part V.C.
54. See discussion infra Part V.D.
55. See discussion irz Part V.E.
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Evans.' This analysis will demonstrate that the Act is unconstitutional
and should either be repealed or struck down.
II. THE "AcT TO PROTECr TRADMONAL MARRIAGE AND PROHIBrr
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES"
A. The In-State Provision and the Legal Implications of Exclusion
One operative provision, which I will call the in-state provision,
pertains to marriages contracted within Maine, and states that "[plersons
of the same sex may not contract marriage."" This provision is added
to the existing provisions of Maine's law on civil marriages, which for-
bid marriages within certain degrees of consanguinity, polygamy, and
marriages by people impaired by mental illness or mental retardation."
An existing statute provides that marriages performed in Maine which
run afoul of the consanguinity, polygamy, and disability restrictions are
void; the Act puts marriage by same-gender couples in the same
category. 59
56. 116 S. Ct. 1620(1996).
57. M.REv. STAT. ANN. tit 19-A, § 701(5) (West 1998).
58. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(2)-(5) (West 1998) provides as follows:
2. Prohibitions based on degrees of consanguinity, exceptions. This subsection governs
marriage between relatives.
A. A man may not many his mother, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, sister,
brother's daughter, sister's daughter, father's sister, mother's sister, the daughter of his
father's brother or sister or the daughter of his mother's brother or sister. A woman may
not marry her father, grandfather, son, grandson, brother, brother's son, sister's son,
father's brother, mother's brother, the son of her father's brother or sister or the son of
her mother's brother or sister.
B. Notwithstanding paragraph A, a man may marry the daughter of his father's
brother or sister or the daughter of his mother's brother or sister, and a woman may
marry the son of her father's brother or sister or the son of her mother's brother or sister
as long as, pursuant to sections 651 and 652, the man or woman provides the physician's
certificate of genetic counseling.
3. Persons under disability. A person who is impaired by reason of mental illness or
mental retardation to the extent that that person lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make, communicate or implement responsible decisions concerning that
person's property or person is not capable of contracting marriage. For the purposes of
this section:
A. "Mental illness" means a psychiatric or other disease that substantially impairs
a person's mental health; and
B. "Mental retardation" means a condition of significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning resultihg in or associated with concurrent impairments in adaptive behavior
and manifested during thedevelopmental period.
4. Polygamy. A marriage contracted while either party is not divorced from a living
wife or husband is void.
5. Same sex marriage prohibited. Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage.
59. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 751 (West 1998) ("Ie following marriages are void
and dissolved without legal process: ... A marriage prohibited in section 701, if solemnized in this
State.").
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The prohibition on same-gender couples marrying excludes them from
receiving a wide range of rights and benefits, as well as from taking on
a multitude of responsibilities.' Statutory provisions regarding marriage
recognize the emotional bonds that can be part of marriage; others deal
with and define financial aspects of the relationship, and still others deal
with a combination of emotional and financial aspects.
For example, Maine's Family and Medical Leave Act allows leave for
employees to care for only a seriously ill spouse, parent, or child.6
Maine's wrongful death statute allows recovery only by a spouse or
blood relation. Loss of consortium protections apply only to spouses.6
Moreover, a privilege to keep confidences silent without legal reprisal
is granted in the rules of evidence only to those who are legally
married." Spouses have a duty to support one another and a right to be
supported; unrelated individuals do not.' Interspousal property transfers
of any amount generally are tax-free; transfers between non-spouses of
amounts greater than $10,000 are taxable in some circumstances."
Under Maine's intestate succession laws, only spouses and blood
relatives are granted rights of inheritance.6' In addition, if a married
person domiciled in Maine dies, a surviving spouse has the right to take
an elective share of the decedent's estate."
Numerous other provisions turn on marriage.69 No comprehensive
60. For a general discussion of laws pertaining to marriage, see Chambers, supra note 15.
61. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 843(4)(D) (West Supp. 1997-1998).
62. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (west 1998).
63. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 302 (West Supp. 1997-1998).
64. ME. R. EvID. 504.
65. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1652(1) (west 1998) (the spouse may petition the
court to order the non-supporting spouse to contribute support); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
552 (west 1983) (failure to support spouse is a Class E crime).
66. 26 U.S.C. § 1041 (1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 2503 (gifts greater than
$10,000 are taxable); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 4641(C)(4) (deeds between husband and wife
are exempt from State real estate transfer tax). See BORIS L BrrE AND LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 1 123.3.1, P-123-5 (2d ed. 1993).
67. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. Lit. 18-A, §§ 2-102,2-103 (west 1998). In fact, if no spouse or
blood relative exists to claim the inhetance, the estate of the intestate passes to the state, regardless
of the presence of a same-sex partner. Id §2-105. While one may argue that these are not actually
burdens since they can be "cured" by a person making a will, there are several problems with that
argument. First, there is a heightened risk that estate plans by gay men and lesbians will be
challenged by family members, see Chambers, supra note 15, at 458 n.38, and second, gay men and
lesbians are like other people in that they mean to make wills, see id. at 456 n.33, but often do not.
68. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-201 (West 1998).
69. For a few examples, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2927 (West 1998) (authorized
driver for personal auto insurance rental coverage includes spouse), ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 2843A (West 1997-1998) (custody of remains of a deceased person shall be given to the spouse
or next of kin unless the deceased directed otherwise), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tiL 5, § 18454
(West 1989) (local districts may supply certain state retirement benefits where beneficiary is limited
to surviving spouse or dependent children). The failure to recognize same-gender relationships
means that disclosure of such relationships appears not to be required by governmental ethics law.
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1012, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19 (West 1989 & West Supp.
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study of all statutes mentioning marriage has been done in Maine to my
knowledge, but a federal study by the General Accounting Office found
1049 federal statutes under which marital or spousal status affects an
entitlement, right, or obligation.7" Federal law restricts immigration by
foreign-born nationals, except if the foreign-born national has a valid
marriage to a United States citizen.71 Divorce also provides important
ordering principles for persons whose marriages fail. 2 Despite the
importance of marriage and its responsibilities, there is almost no state
review of who can enter the institution and no attempt to educate would-
be spouses as to its implications. 3
B. The Out-of-State Provision
The Act's second provision, which I will call the out-of-state
provision, states that "any marriage performed in another state that
would violate any provisions of subsections 2 to 5 if performed in this
State is not recognized in this State and is considered void if the parties
take up residence in this State." 4 Subsections 2 through 5 are the
provisions forbidding marriages within certain degrees of consanguinity,
polygamy, and marriages of people under disability, as well as the new
prohibition on persons of the same gender marrying in Maine.75
This provision declares that marriages of persons who marry legally
in one state, and later move to Maine, are invalid in Maine, regardless
1997-1998). Neither the definition of immediate family, see id. § G, nor the definition of relatives,
see id § 1, would include a gay employee's life partner.
70. Rept. No. GA01, OCO 97-16, 1997 WL 67783 (Jan. 31, 1997).
71. See 3 CHARLES GORDON ErAL, IMMIRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 36.02 (rev. ed.
1996); Chambers, supra note 15, at 458 n.39.
72. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the state
could not require indigent persons seeking divorce to pay a filing fee, in view of the importance of
marriage and divorce, and in view of the fact that individuals had no other way besides divorce to
resolve their disputes. Maine's premarital agreement statute permits an agreement regarding future
support, division of property, and other aspects of a couple's breakup, to be made only by those who
are "prospective spouses" and that such an agreement is effective only "upon marriage." ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. ti. 19-A, § 602(1) (West 1998). Another ordering principle can be found in "spousal
support," fonnerly known as "alimony," which is available only to those who were legally married.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 951 (West 1998). Equitable distribution of property is also only
available to persons who are married. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 19-A, § 722-A (West 1998).
73. There is little restriction on entry into marriage and no statutory effort to educate people
seeking to enter this institution on the rights or responsibilities of marriage. There is a three-day
waiting period before a license may be issued, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 652(1) (West
1998), which may be waived. See id. § 652 (4). The only information that couples are given when
they obtain a marriage license is - brochure about the effects of alcohol and drugs on fetuses. Id.
§ 652(5). As Professor Mary Ann Glendon points out, "it is not too much of an eaggeration to say
that the present legal regulation of marriage in the United States is already just a matter of licensing
and registration." Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage,
62 VA. L REV. 663, 681 (1976).
74. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(1-A) (West 1998).
75. See id. § 701(2)-(5).
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of any circumstances including how long the couple was marr-ed. 6 This
provision is targeted at same-gender couples in general, and the Hawaii
marriage case in particular If Hawaii or another state allows marriage
by same-gender couples, such couples who reside in and marry in that
state will reasonably consider themselves married and rely on the legal
consequences of being married If they move to Maine, they are
stripped of the responsibilities and rights of marriage under the Act.W
Prior Maine law, by contrast, invalidated certain marriages when a
couple got married out of state in order to evade Maine law."1
C. The Findings and Purposes
The Act contains several "findings" and "purposes" that are entirely
new to Maine law. It provides that municipal clerks and courts have a
duty to construe the provisions of Maine's marriage laws in accordance
with the following findings and purposes:
76. Id. There are major legal questions about whether Maine can constitutionally do this
without violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the right to travel, and other federal
constitutional provisionsr tights. See sources citod sra note 30. The Defese of Ma ria Act
(DOMA) provides that states can ignore other states' decrees allov6ing same-gender marriage. but
DOMA may be uncon;situtional. See sources cited supra note 30.
77. See LD. 1017 (ll8thLegis. 1997) (summaryof the bill states that it"prohibits persons
of the same sex from contracting marriage").
78. The text of the Maine bill was taken from a petition sponsored by Concerned Main:
Familie which obtained enough signaturm that the bill would have bad to be on the ballot in Nov-
ember 1997 if the legislature did not pass it Me-. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18. ThchairofConcered
Maine Families, Carolyn Cosby, stated that the bill was necessary because of the pending Hawaii
case. Paul Carier, Maine Group Seeks to Ban Gay Wedlock PORTLAND PRESS HERALD. May 2
1996, at Al. The 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court ruling in Baehr was cited repeatedly as a reason for
introduction of the legislation. Gay Rights Opponents File Legislation Targeting Same-Sex
Marriage, BANGORDAn.Y NEWS, May 3,1996, available in 1996 WL21923; Lav=e n n
Samne-SexMariages a Legislative Mater, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, July 2, 1996, avaiable in 1996
WL 10702445 (Lockman is the Vice Chair of Concerned Maine Families), Petition Drive Success
Claimed Gay-Marriage CouldBe on Ballot, BANGOR DAILY NEws, Nov. 13. 1996, available in
1996 WL 10710237; Francis X. Quinn, Same-S er Marriage Petition Cleared Legislature to Vote
on C tizen Initiative, BANGOR DAiLY NEwS, Feb. 8,1997, available in 1997 VJL 4757645.
79. While state laws vary considerably about what goes along with marriage, there arc
certain basic similarities such as provisions for support of a spouse during the marriage, intestat
succession, privilege, wrongful death, loss of consortium, as well as provisions for divorce. alimony
(also known as spousal support), and property division in the event of divorce. See generally
Ho, MnI. CLARK, Je., THm LAw OF DoMSnc RELA O N Tim UN E STATES (2d ed. 1987);
Chambers, supra note 15, at 447-91.
80. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tiL 19-A, § 701(1-A) (West 1998). As noted above, this
Article does not deal with specific cnstitutional issues about restricting the validity of such out-of-
state marriages. See supra note 30.
81. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(1) (West 1998). This is what is known as a.
"marriage evasion statute" which numerous stats have. See Coxsupra note 30, at 1078 & n.262.
This evasion statute remains on the books; the Act seems to broae Miles non-recognition of




1. Findings. The people of the State of Maine find that:
A. The union of one man and one woman joined in traditional
monogamous marriage is of inestimable value to society; the State has
a compelling interest to nurture and promote the unique institution of
traditional monogamous marriage in the support of harmonious
families and the physical and mental health of children; and that the
State has the compelling interest in promoting the moral values
inherent in traditional monogamous marriage.
2. Purposes. The purposes of this chapter are:
A. To encourage the traditional monogamous family unit as the
basic building block of our society, the foundation of harmonious and
enriching family life;
B. To nurture, sustain and protect the traditional monogamous
family unit in Maine society, its moral imperatives, its economic
function and its unique contribution to the rearing of healthy children;
and
C. To support and strengthen traditional monogamous Maine
families against improper interference from out-of-state influences or
edicts."
This provision requires clerks and courts to construe Maine's "marriage
laws" in accordance with the findings and purposes. But it does not
define 'Maine's marriage laws," although, as noted above, many Maine
laws pertain to marriage.83 It appears, however, that the term refers to
Title 19-A, chapter 23, which is entitled "Marriage.""
I. A BASIC NTRODUCrION TO CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF STATUTES
Part of the task of legislating is drawing lines and making class-
ifications; statutory classifications generally burden some members of
society."s Statutes are presumed to be constitutional,86 but there are
various reasons why a law may be unconstitutional. Every person is
entitled to the "equal protection of the laws"; 7 if a law violates equal
82. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 650(1), (2) (West 1998).
83. See supra Part ILA.
84. Title 19-A, chapter 23 contains thre subchapters: first, "General Provisions," second,
"Restrictions," and third, "Void Marriages and Annulment."
85. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) ("The Fourteenth Amendment's
promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must co-exist with the
practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting
disadvantage to various groups or persons.").
86. See, e.g., Irish v. Ginibel, 1997 ME 50, 6,691 A.2d 664,669.
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I: "No state shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Me. Const. art 1. § 6-A: "No person shall be...
denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of [that person's] civil rights
or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof." This introduction to constitutional analysis of
statutes deals primarily with federal equal protection law, relevant sections of Maine's Constitution
are discussed more fully in Part IV.
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protection, itis unconstitutional. Laws are supposed to treat similarly
situated people in a similar manner, if they do not they may be unconsti-
tutional for violating equal protection 9 In determining whether a law
violates equal protection, courts in most circumstances apply a standard
that is very deferential towards legislative decisions, called "rational
basis scrutiny." However, laws based on certain classifications, such as
race or gender, and laws burdening fundamental rights, receive some
form of "heightened scrutiny" which means that courts appraise such
statutes more critically. Such a standard typically requires the state to
show that the challenged provision furthers an important or compelling
state interest and is narrowly tailored to further only that interest.
Laws which classify explicitly on the basis of race, for example, are
automatically "suspect"9 ° receive strict scrutiny, and are rarely upheld.'
"Strict scrutiny" means that the challenged law must be based on a
compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to further only
that interest.' Laws which contain gender classifications, as opposed to
racial classifications, have been at times accorded "intermediate
scrutiny," which is less rigorous than "strict scrutiny."' In 1996, the
Supreme Court held in United States v. Virginia that gender-based
classifications were unacceptable unless they could be supported by an
"exceedingly persuasive justification."' In Part V.B, I argue that the
Act makes a gender-based classification and that heightened scrutiny
should apply.
Laws which distribute benefits and burdens in a way that is inconsis-
tent with fundamental rights also receive strict scrutiny. 6 For example,
strict scrutiny applies to laws penalizing the fundamental right to
88. Important debates persist concerning equal protection law, and the appropriaterole of
courts in democracy. See generaUy Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy'$ Domain,
50 VAND. L REV. 361 (1997); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AmD DImSmn .A TIHFRy oF
JuDICa.MEw (Harv. U. Press 1980); LAURECE H-. TRME, ANMRCAN CoNsntmo AL LAWI
1436-37 (2nd ed. 1988).
89. See Cleburne v. Clebume Living Cer., Inc., 473 US. 432,439 (1985).
90. See Korteatsuv. United States. 323 U.S. 214.216 (1944) (balding that legal restrictions
curtailing civil rights of a racial group are immediately suspect and subject to rigid scrutiny.
involuntary resettlemeat and internment of Japanee citizens during World War II satisfies such
scrutiny).
91. See TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1451.
92. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. C. 1894,1899 (1996) (holding thata North Carolina
redistricting plan did not survive strict scrutiny because it was "not narrovy tailored to s erv a
compelling state interest").
93. Intermediat scrutiny has required that legislation be imed to furth:ran important-not
necessarily a compelling-state inferest, and that it relate substantially to thz important objective.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190. 197-98 (1976). It is thus harder to satisfy than rational basis
scrutiny but easier to satisfy than strict scrutiny.
94. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
95. See li& at 2271 (citing mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 958 US. 718, 724
(1982)).
96. See TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1454.
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interstate travel. 7 Supreme Court cases such as Loving v. Virginia,98
Zablocki v. Redhail,9 and Turner v. Safley'" have established that the
right to marry is of fundamental importance. The Supreme Court has
held that laws which directly and substantially burden the right to marry
receive heightened scrutiny."°' Griswold v. Connecticut"0 2 recognized a
right to privacy inherent in marriage. An Alaska Superior Court decision
recently held that the right to choose one's own life partner was
fundamental and protected by the right of privacy."0 3 I argue, then, in
Part V.C, that the Act denies the fundamental right to marry and privacy
rights to a specific group--gay men and lesbians-and that heightened
scrutiny should apply.
Courts have also applied heightened scrutiny to classifications based
on other characteristics besides race and gender. For example, distinc-
tions based on out-of-wedlock birth receive "intermediate scrutiny.""
The Supreme Court has never fully explained the characteristics which
justify intermediate review.0 This type of analysis originates with
Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products
Co., °6 where he wrote that
legislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
[may] be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
97. See id at 1455-57; see also, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding
that the right to travel is fundamental; the state's purpose in limiting immigration by indigents is
not legitimate; a one-year waiting period for welfare benefits for new arrivals is unconstitutional).
98. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a law against racial intermariage on the grounds that
it violated the equal protection and due process clauses; marriage is "one of the basic civil rights
of man").
99. 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding classifications directly and substantially interfering with
the right to marry are subject to rigorous scrutiny; statute requiring non-custodial parents who
wanted to marry to prove that they were up-to-date on child support was unconstitutional).
100. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding regulation allowing inmates to many only when the
superintendent determines compelling reasons are present is an unconstitutional deprivation of
inrates' marriage rights).
101. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 386. The standard of review of marriage classifications
set forth in Zablocki may be "marginally less demanding than traditional strict scrutiny" but it also
may be indistinguishable from strict scrutiny. See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and
the Family, 93 HARV. L REV. 1156, 1250 n.12 (1980).
102. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the privacy right in marriage is fundamental; criminal
law forbidding use of contraceptives is held unconstitutional).
103. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CL 1998 WL 88743, at *5-6
(Alaska Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1998).
104. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 US. 91,99 (1982) (stating that rules based on illegitimacy
must be "substantially related to a legitimate state interest" to be upheld). Similarly, rules
discriminating against foreign nationals are subject to scrutiny more exacting than other rules, but
less exacting than rules discriminating on the basis of race. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-
82(1976).
105. See TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1614.
106. 304 U.S. 144(1938).
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other types of legislation.... [Slimilar considerations [may] enter
into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, ... or
national .... or racial minorities... prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 7
Much discussion has taken place about the implications of these
words.itn Some courts' 9 and many commentators"' have concluded that
statutes directed at gay men and lesbians should receive heightened
scrutiny, since prejudice against that group tends to curtail the operation
of the political processes normally to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties. I assert, then, in Part V.D, that laws classifying on the basis of
sexual orientation, such as the Act, should be accorded heightened
scrutiny.
Next, after reviewing these three theories, I argue in Part VE that if
heightened scrutiny, whether strict, intermediate, or some other variety,
is applied to the Act, it would be held unconstitutional.
Finally, in circumstances other than where fundamental rights or
dubious classifications are involved, when a litigant claims that a law
violates his right to equal protection, courts generally will apply
"rational basis scrutiny" to the law."' This means that courts will
uphold the law if two conditions are met: first, it must be based on a
legitimate state interest, and second, it must be rationally related to
furtherance of that interest." This standard is intended to be extremely
deferential to the legislature, but is not a rubber stamp.m For example,
the United States Supreme Court in 1996 in Romer v. Evans, using
rational basis scrutiny, held that Colorado's Amendment 2 to its
Constitution violated equal protection principles." 4 Amendment 2
provided that no state or local government could pass or enforce any
107. Id. at 152-53 n.4 (emphasis added).
108. See generally ELY, supra note 88, at 153; Lea Btilmayer. Carole. Conflics. and the
Fate of the -Lnide-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L REV. 1291 (1986); Jaae S. Schacter, Romerv. Evans
and Denwcracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L REV. 361 (1997).
109. See infra note 237.
110. See infra note 239.
111. SeeTRmE, supranote88,at 1439-43.
112. See id.
113. See, e.g., Zobel v. William 457 U.S. 55,65 (1982) (holding Alaska's statutory formula
for dividing shares of surplus oil-boom wealth to state residents in direct proportion to the length
of post-statchood residence in Alaska unconstitutional because no legitima -sta interest supportad
a distinclion between residents based on how long they have lived in state); Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,455 (1985) (holding a zoning ordinance that, as applied. ruirt
a special use permit in residential areas for institutions housing mentally retarded person
unconstitutional where circumstances suggested their exclusion resulted from an irrational prejudice
against the retarded).
114. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
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laws banning discrimination on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation."1 In the last part of this Article, I assert that the
Act lacks even a rational basis; it is not rationally related to furthering
a legitimate state interest.1 6
IV. ASPECTS OF THE MAINE CONSTITUTION
A. The Independent Vitality of the Maine Constitution
Maine must provide at least the level of protection for constitutional
rights mandated by federal law,117 whatever that might be. Maine's
Constitution has independent vitality,' and federal interpretations of
parallel federal provisions are not binding on Maine courts in their
interpretations of Maine constitutional provisions."" Maine's courts
have held that the Maine Constitution provides additional guarantees
beyond those contained in the Federal Constitution," as have many
115. Id
116. SeePartV.F.
117. See U.S. CONST. art. VE "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance theeo ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
118. See generaUy MARLL J. TBNE THEMAINE STATE CONSTITUION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE (1992) (exploring the history and explaining the various provisions of the Maine State
Constitution).
119. See, e.g., State v. Fick, 495 A.2d 339, 343 (Me. 1985) (stating that interpretation of
Maine Constitution's doublejeopardy clause does not depend on interpretation of federal double
jeopardy clause); Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 97-98 (1951) (stating that Maine courts, in
interpreting the Maine Constitution, are not bound by other courts' interpretations of their
constitutions).
120. See eg.,Statev.Sklar,317A.2d 160, 169(Me. 1974) (noting that the state constitution,
but not the Federal Constitution, guarantees trial by jury for all criminal offenses and similar
language of federal and state provisions is not dispositive); Danforth v. State Dep't of Health and
welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 800 (Me. 1973) (holding that the state constitution protects parnmt's right
to custody of child and that parent has due process right under the state constitution to court-
appointed counsel although the Federal Constitution may not guarantee that right). The status of
the pivilege against self-incrimination is less clear;, in State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120 (Me.
1982), the Law Court held that the Maine constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
prohibited statements made by a defendant if not the "exercise of his own free will and rational
intellect" Id. at 1123. Although the Caouette court did not expressly state that its interpretation
indicated that the state privilege against self-incrimination was broader than the federal privilege,
its holding seemed to indicate this. In fact, he court in Caouette appeared to recognize that its
holding would create a state constitutional privilege broader in scope than the federal privilege:
"[Federal decisions do not serve t6 establish the complete statement of controlling law but rather
to delineate a constitutional minimum or universal mandate for the federal control of every State."
Id. at 1122. In Ste v. Easman, 691 A.2d 179 (Me. 1997), however, the Law Court stated that it
had "consistently interpreted the Maine privilege co-extensively with the federal privilege" in terms
of the substance of the privilege. Id at 183. For a recent discussion, see Donald W. Macomber,
A Callfor Consistency: State v. Caouette is No Longer Viable in Light ofColorado v. Connelly and
State v. Eastman, 50 ME. L REv. 1,61 (1998).
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other states' courts, such as New Hampshire,121 Vermont, 22 and
Massachusetts. Decisions by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court,
sitting as the Law Court, which rest on separate, adequate, and inde-
pendent state grounds are not subject to federal review."
Many state supreme courts have used the analytical approach of first
determining whether there is a state constitutional violation before
considering whether there is a federal constitutional violation.'
Reasons for this include logic,' judicial economy, comity, and
responsibility of state judges for their state's law." 7 The Law Court in
1984 announced that it would adopt this "state law first" approach,"
and has reiterated it several times." In State v. Rundtett,'" the court
stated that it was using the standard of Craig v. Boren" as only a "guide
to the degree of scrutiny required" for gender-based classifications.'
However, as Maine constitutional law specialist Marshall Tinkle pointed
out in 1992, "the habit of relying exclusively on federal constitutional
law had become so ingrained--both on the part of the judges and on the
121. See State v. Ball, 471 A2d 347 (N. 1983) (analyzing state c titutional claim before
turning to Federal Constitution, and coanuding state constitution's limitations an sech and
were stricter than federal limitations).
122. See State v. KIrchoff, 587 A.2d 988 (VL 1991) (stating that the Vermont Constitution
provides more protection against government searches and sinures than does the Fedeal
Constitution).
123. See Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N..2d 233 (Mass. 1994) (interpreting the
Massachusetts Constitution's free exercise of religion clause as broader than federal protections).
124. See Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (stating that sate court decisions based
on separate, adequate, and independent state law are not subject to federal review). The Hawaii
Supreme Courts decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Raw. 1993). reted entirely on state
constitutional grounds and therefore was not subject to federal review.
125. Atleast twelvestatesupreme courts have adopted the practic. See FkMEs, srpra note
26, at 27-30;, see also Hans A. Lindr, First Things First: Rediscovering the Stares' Bills of Rights,
9 U. BALT. L REV. 379, 383 (1980).
126. One particularly influential explanation of the logical reason for this sequence is as
follows:
[Tihe proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law,
before reaching a federal constitutional claim This is requi d not fbr t sake of eithbr
paochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the
Federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law.
Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123.126 (Or. 1981).
127. See FRUMs, sura note 26, at 119-20.
128. See State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148. 1150 (Me. 1984) (stating that the court will
examine claims for state constitutional violation first; if claim fails, Federal Constitution nill be
analyzed).
129. See State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 343 (Me. 1985) (stating tha interpretation of the
Maine Constitution's doublejeopardy claus does not depend on intetpretation of the fed-I double
jeopardy clause); Portland v. lacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985) (stating that the court will
refrain from rling on federal constitutional questions when state constitutional provisions resolve
thematter).
130. 391 A.2d 815 (Me. 1978).
131. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
132. Statev.Rundlett,391 A2d at 818.
364 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:345
part of the lawyers who framed the issues for adjudication-that few
decisions so far have in fact rested on 'adequate and independent' state
constitutional grounds." ' As Tinlde rightly observed, there is much
room for development of constitutional jurisprudence under the Maine
Constitution."3
B. Maine's Equal Protection Clause and the Forgotten Civil
Rights/Nondiscrimination Clauses
Maine is one of thirteen states which has a constitutional provision
containing an explicit, mandatory equal protection clause."' The Law
Court has characterized the equal protection guarantee of the Maine
Constitution as "coextensive with," "equal to," "the same as," and "no
more stringent than," the federal equal protection guarantee.'36 The
language of Maine's constitutional anti-discrimination provision,
however, is more extensive than that of the federal equal protection
clause. Maine's provision states that "[n]o person shall be... denied
the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of that
person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise
thereof." "37 The phrases pertaining to enjoying civil rights and not being
discriminated against in the exercise thereof are not present in the
Federal Constitution."3
Section 6-A was added in 1963, upon the recommendation of the
Second Constitutional Commission of the State of Maine. 39  The
133. Twmua, supra note 118, at 16 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)). The
Vermont Supreme Court, in State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985), usefifly described the process
of bringing state constitutional claims.
134. TDLE, supra note 118, at 16.
135. See Me. Const. art , § 6-A; FRMSEN, supra note 26, at 148 n.7.
136. See Choroszy v. Tso, 647 A.2d 803,808 (Me. 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of
statute of limitations; state equal protection guarantee is "equivalent" to federal guarantee); Peters
v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50,52 n.1 (Me. 1991) (upholding the Liquor Liability Act damage cap and stating
that federal and state guarantees are "coextensive"); School Admin. Dist No. I v. Comm'r, Dep't
of Educ, 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995); Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d
1284, 1287 n.3 (Me. 1993) (upholding recycling ordinance and stating that Maine and Federal
Constitutions guarantee "the same right to equal protection"); Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 440
A.2d 334,338 n.4 (Me. 1982) (holding that ordinance allowing rental assistance but not mortgage
assistance did not violate equal protection; state equal protection guarantee "no more stringent" than
federal guarantee); State v. Richardson, 285 A.2d 842, 844 (Me. 1972); see also Blount v. Dep't
of Educational and Cultural Services, 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988) (holding that state equal protection
clause gave no protection beyond that of the free exercise clause of the United States Constitution
to parents challenging state's authority to give prior approval to home schooling program).
137. Me. Const. art I, § 6-A (emphasis added).
138. Article 1, § 6-A of the Maine Constitution also lacks a state action requirement, which
is present in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § I.
139. See LD. 33 (101st Legis. 1963), reprinted in REIoRTSOFTHEMAIN CONSMr ONAL
COMMISStON (1963). The Commission's report stated that,"[a] due process clause, similar to that
which appears as the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution and which would forbid
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original language of the proposed amendment contained a prohibition on
a person being "denied the enjoyment of... civil rights or be[ing]
discriminated against because of race, religion, sex or ancestry."14
0
However, the final language of section 6-A does not limit the
protection of civil rights to classifications on the basis of sex, race,
religion or ancestry, as the original draft did. 41 Some legislators feared
the consequences of outlawing sex discrimination, and so drafted an
amendment removing the limitations."4 One legislator questioned what
the limitations were on the nondiscrimination principle, given that the
limitations on sex and other specific types of discrimination had been
removed."" In response, one legislator made the point that the Federal
discrimination against any person because of race, religion, sex or anmcestry should be added to the
Maine Constitution." Id. at 2. After quoting the proposed language, the Report proceeds:
We do not believe that anyone will challenge the desirability of amending th:
Constitution along the lines above suggested. It may well be said that in various places
within the Declaration of Rights, as the same is now writte much of the protection
given by the proposed new duorocess clause appears. However, the rights with which
we are here concerned are so fundamental and so important that if there is a second or
repeat guarantee, such underwriting of protection is, we believe, all to the good.
Id. The Second Constitutional Commission did not discuss the issue in any detail See SAMM
SHLY, JR., PROCEDINGS OFMM SECOND CONSITTIMONAL COM;ISSION OFTHE SrATE OF MAINE,
118-19,243-44,253-54 (1963).
140. LID. 1448 (101stLegis. 1963) (presented by Senator Whittalkrof Pnobot) (emphasis
added). A series of 1962 articles by Professor Edward F. Dow in the Maine Sunday Telegram
entitled Our Unbnown Consinaion suggested adding a due process clause and a statement that no
one would be "denied the equal protection of the laws, nor denied civil rights or be discriminated
against because of sex, race, religion or ancestry." EDWARD F. DOW, OUR UNXNOWN Co.%ST7t-
"nON (1962). These articls wve distributed to the Commission. They appear to have played a re
in adoption of section 6-A. See SLS.Y, supra note 139, at 139. See Tmkle supra note 118, at38.
141. CommitteeAmendmentA to S.P. 527, LD. 1448 (Fling No. S-275)remnoved the words
"because of race, religion, sex or ancestry:" Committee Amendment A also specified that the
referendum question would be "shall the constitution be amended as propomd by a resolution of the
Legislature Forbidding Discrimination Against Any Person?" Committee Amendment A to S.P.
527, LD. 1448.
142. As Rep. Pease remadked.
the Committee's seven members who reported "ought to pass." found it necessary to do
some amending to take out specifically among other things, the word sx... it had to
be called to the attention of the commission present at the hearing of the fadt that what
might happen for example at Bowdoin College if this part of the Constitutional
Amendment were left in and a qualified young lady presented herself for admson.
Legis. Rec., House, 3113-14 (1963) (statement of Rep. Pease).
143. Rep. Easton raised the question of
recalling that the Senate Amendment eliminates the language which specifies the type
of discrimination, i.e., race, religion, sex, or ancestry which is forbiddm, re:mmbering
this, I am curious to know what the term discrimination would really mean. Without
discrimination by reason of say sex, or any other limiting ftaor, we perhaps am thromn
to the dictionary definition of the word which means to be particular... I don't
understand what the words civil rights mean.
Id. at 3111 (statement of Rep. Eastman). Rep. Smith stared that the amedment with the words
removed "is a statement of a fundamental principle to guarantee civil rights even as they am
guaranteed in the Federal Constitution." I& at 3112 (statement of Rep. Smith).
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Constitution was drafted in broad and general terms so that as new
problems arose, the document would be flexible enough to deal with
them and argued that the Maine Legislature should do the same thing
and approve the amendment.'"
The final amendment, then, not only has an equal protection clause,
but, in addition, states, first, that no one will "be denied the enjoyment
of his civil rights," and second, that no one will "be discriminated
against in the exercise thereof." 145 Further, it does not limit the types
of impermissible denials of "civil rights" to those based on race, sex,
religion or ancestry, but rather, it leaves "civil rights" unlimited by
qualifiers. No Law Court cases have explicitly interpreted these
provisions; rather, Law Court equal protection cases have only discussed
the explicit "equal protection" guarantee. 46
No other state's equal protection provision has identical language to
Maine's provision; in fact, Maine's provision is broader than that of
other states since it has both an explicit equal protection guarantee and
a nondiscrimination civil rights guarantee. 47 The additional "civil
rights" and "discrimination" language in Maine's amendment creates a
strong textual basis for finding that the civil rights and nondiscrimination
provisions of the Maine Constitution's section 6-A actually are broader
than those of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.'"
144. Rep. Smith also stated that
when the Federal Constitution was adopted and fundamental rights were set forth in the
Constitution, many, many problems did not then exist... They were anticipated by the
founders of our Constitution and this Legislature should be far-seeing enough and basic
in its thinking so that it now must and should anticipate problems; and this is merely a
reiteration of the basic truths which are in our state and also in our State and Federal
Constitutions.
/I
145. Me. Const., art. L § 6-A.
146. See supra note 136.
147. In the states which have explicit equal protection guarantees, the provisions tend to fall
into one of two categories. One type of provision simply states that people have a right to be free
from denials of equal protection. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. , § 1, J 2 ("No person shall be denied
the equal protection ofthe laws"). A second type of provision states that people have a right to be
free from denials of equal protection and in addition states that people have a right to be free from
discrimination in the exercise of their civil rights on the basis of race, color, sex, or various other
categories. See. e.g., CONN. CONsr. art. , § 20, ("No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or
her civil or political rights because ofreligion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or physical
or mental disability"). Maine's-provision is unique and broader, for it forbids denials of equal
protection and forbids discrimination in the exercise of civil rights, but does not limit the anti-
discrimination protection simply to discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex or other
characteristics.
148. Section 6-A of Maine's Constitution, as noted here, contains both an equal protection
clause and distinct civil rights and anti-discrimination protections. Generally in this Article, for
ease of reference, I will refer to these protections together, as equal protection rights.
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C. Maine's Natural Rights Clause
In addition, Maine's Constitution contains Article i section 1, which
concerns "[n]atural rights." It states: '"Natural Rights. All people are
born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." 49 This provision has no
federal analogue. Prior to the 1963 passage of Article I, section 6-A, this
"natural rights" provision was at times seen as similar to the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Legislation which
does not benefit a legitimate public purpose has been struck down under
this provision.151 Since the 1963 passage of Article I, section 6-A, it has
fallen into disuse. Nonetheless, it presents a basis for review of
legislation which interferes with individuals' "inherent rights!"L
Several state courts have found that almost identically worded provisions
form the basis of state privacy claims." Maine's Constitution is the
only state constitution which contains both an equal protection clause
and a natural rights clause."s Placing the broad language of Article I,
section 6-A, with its equal protection, civil rights and anti-discrimination
language, alongside the natural rights clause of Article I section 1,
creates an expanded foundation for the conclusion that Maine's
Constitution provides broader protections for individual rights than does
the Federal Constitution.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE Acr
A. Introduction
There are three major theories under which the Act could receive
heightened scrutiny if challenged in court. First, the Act creates a
149. Me. Const art. L § 1.
150. See TmK, supra note 118, at 25.
151. See id. at 24-25; State v. Old Tavern Farn, 180 A. 473. 133 Me. 468 (1935) (holding
the statute requiring operators of milk gathering stations to give bond to scu payment of
purchases of milk and cream unconstitutional as invalid execise of police power and violation of
Article L § 1); State v. Union Oil Company of Maine, 120 A.2d 708, 151 Me. 438 (1956) (holding
that the statute prohibiting retail gas dealers from displaying price signs except signs of limited siz
was not reasonably neceary for accomplishrant of lcgitimat police power purpose and thns as
a violation of Article 1, § I and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
152. Another provision is Article 1, section 24, a"saving clause." Me. Const. art. L § 24.
("Other rights not impaired. The enumeration of certain rights shall not impair nor deny others
retained by the people."). Tinkle points out that "]ike the first section of this article, the last
section may be used as avehicle for recognizing rights that ar or ought to be protected at common
law." TmKM supra note 118, at 54. No Maine cases have been dedded under this provision.
153. See infra note 220.
154. See generaUy FRmISEN, supm note 26.
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gender-based classification. Second, the Act directly and substantially
interferes with fundamental marriage and privacy rights. Third, the Act
targets gay and lesbian individuals, who should be declared members of
a protected class for equal protection purposes. Applying any form of
heightened scrutiny to the Act, it would fail. In addition, applying
deferential "rational basis" scrutiny, the Act fails since it is not based on
a legitimate state interest and is not reasonably related to fulfillment of
that interest. Each of these arguments will be discussed seriatum.
B. Gender-Based Classification Analysis
1. The Gender-Based Classfication of the Act
One analysis is that the Act forbids people from marrying on the basis
of their gender.155 Under the terms of the Act, a man can not marry a
man, but a woman can marry a man.' This is a gender-based classifica-
tion."5 As Judge Michalski of the Alaska Superior Court recently wrote:
That [the statute forbidding marriage by same-gender couples] is a
sex-based classification can readily be demonstrated: if twins, one
male and one female, both wished to marry a woman and otherwise
met all of the Code's requirements, only gender prevents the twin
sister from marrying under the present law. Sex-based classification
can hardly be more obvious.'
Access to marriage is thus conditioried on the gender-based classification
contained in the statute, according to this argument.159 The Hawaii
Supreme Court in Baehr adopted this approach, applying the analysis of
race-based marriage classifications in Loving v. Virginia"6 to gender-
based marriage classifications.' Heightened scrutiny indubitably
155. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(5) (West 1998) ("Persons of the same sex may not
contract marriage.").
156. Thus, a man who wants to marry a man is similarly situated to a woman who wants to
marry a man. However, because of his gender, the man who wants to many a man is forbidden
from doing so.
157. This analysis was adopted in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). and was one of
the theories endorsed by the court in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI
1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
158. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743, at *6.
159. See id.
160. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Loving v. Virginia was decided both on equal protection and on due
process grounds. The due process aspect of Loving is discussed more fully infra notes 202.03. See
Developments in the La-The-Constitution and the Family, supra note 101, at 1249.
161. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 62-64. This analogy was initially put forward, but
rejected, in a right-to-marry case in 1974. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974). appeal denied, 84 Wash.2d 1008 (Wash. 1974) (holding that the prohibition against same-
gender marriage is not a gender-based classification under the state's Equal Rights Amendment).
In the 1980s, the argument was first developed in academic literature by Professors Andrew
Koppelman and Sylvia Law. See Sylvia A. Law, Homoseuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
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applies to gender-based classifications under both the federal" and
state63 constitutions.
A counterargument as to why the statute does not create a gender-
based classification might go as follows: men and women can both
man'y, so there is no gender-based classification.'" The fallacy of that
argument was discussed at length in the Hawaii Supreme Court's first
decision in Baehr."6 The court analyzed the reasoning of Loving, and
analogized it convincingly to the issue of same-gender marriage. 6
Under the statutory scheme struck down in Loving, a marriage between
a black woman and a black man would be legal, but one between a white
woman and a black man was not."s In Loving, the statute did not forbid
blacks from marrying, or forbid whites from marrying; rather it forbade
them from marrying each other. Virginia had argued that because the
statute provided for the same penalties against whites as it did against
blacks, it did not create unacceptable race-based classifications. 63 This
is precisely the same reasoning that suggests that laws against same-
gender marriage do not create gender-based classifications. This
reasoning was decisively rejected by the Supreme Court in Loving,
where the Court noted that even though the prohibition applied both to
blacks and whites, it was a race-based classification subject to strict
scrutiny.'6 Similarly, the idea that since men can marry, and women can
1988WI&L REV. 187 (1988); Andrew Koppehan, WhyDiscrminnAgainstbisard Gay
Men is Sex Discrhmiaion, 69 N.Y.U. L REV. 197 (1994); see also Andrew Koppelman. The
Miscegnaoan Analogy: Sodonyiaw asSex Discain on, 98 YALE UJ. 145 (1988); Clandia A.
LewisFrom This Day Forward: A Femnine Moral Dircourse on Homosexsal Marriage, 97 YALM
LI. 1783 (1988).
162.. See, eg., United States v. Virginia. 116 S. CL 2264,2275-76 (1996); hfississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725 (1982).
163. See, e.g., State v. Houston, 534 A.2d 1293 (Mfe. 1987) (applying intermediate scrutiny
and vacating gender-specific criminal sentencing decision as unconstitutional).
164. An example ofagender-based classification in this context would be a law stating that
the age below which women could not many was higher than for men (or vice versa). See Phelps
v. Bing 316 NE.2d 775,776-77 (1L 1974) (striking down a statutory =h=me where mal ad to
be 21 to marry without paretal consent, but femaleonly had to be 18 to narry withoutparental
consent).
165. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d at 62-64.
166. See id-
167. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-57, 20-58 (1960 Rcpl. VoL) (repealed 1968); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.s. 1,4 & n3 (1966). The Virginia statutes at issu= in Loing also provided that
white people could only many white people, orpersons, with white and Ameican Indian blood, and
did not forbid other races from intermarrying. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20.54 (1960 Repl. VoL)
(repealed 1968).
168. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 8. Section § 20.59 ofthe Vizginia Code provided
the same penalty (betwarn one and five years in jail) for a white peon" who intermarried with a
"colomed perso" as for a"colored person" who inemarried with a "white person" See VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-59 (1960 RepL VoL) (repealed 1968). "Colored pemron" was defin:d as anyone "in
whom there is ascertainable any Negro blood." I& § 1-14.
169. See Loving v. Virginia, 833 U.S. at 10-11. That same reasoning us rejected by thc
Califboia Supreme Court in 1948 When the Court struck doun California's miscegnation law. See
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marry, the Act does not create a sex-based classification, is incorrect.
Whether a person has the right to marry, under the Act, depends on his
or her gender, as shown by the Alaska court's twin example.
2. The Idea of Marriage
Some argue marriage by couples of the same gender is not "mar-
riage.9'17  Therefore, since marriage by same-gender couples is not
"marriage," a man who wants to marry a man is not similarly situated to
a man who wants to marry a woman. Thus, there is no equal protection
problem with limiting marriage to opposite sex partners. In a 1973
same-gender marriage decision, Jones v. Hallahan,7 1 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held that no constitutional issues were involved
because what the female couple who wanted to get married actually
wanted was "not a marriage.'"'" This notion that same gender couples
simply cannot marry is similar to the trial court's statement in Loving:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red,
and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interfer-
ence with his arrangement there would be no cause for such mar-
riages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not
intend for the races to mixY"
The Hawaii Supreme Court aptly characterized this passage as declaring
that "interracial marriage simply could not exist because the Deity had
deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural, and, in effect, because it
had theretofore never been the 'custom' of the state to recognize mixed
marriages, marriage 'always' having been construed to presuppose a
Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 25-27 & 29 (Cal. 1948). Miscegenation laws were not limited to the
south and west. See supra note 35.
170. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehrv. Miike and the Meaning
of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L REV. 1, 51-55 (1997) (arguing that marriage must be between persons
of the opposite sex by virtue of the nature of marriage); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L REV. 1, 38-39 (1996) (arguing that
the nature of marriage is heterosexual and that heterosexual marital relationships are uniquely
valuable).
171. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
172. L at 590. No equal protection issues were raised in Jones. Other early same-gender
marriage decisions made similar points. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn.
1971), appeal dismissed, 409 US. 810 (1972) (marriage by same-gender couples is not marriage);
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), appeal denied, 84 Wash.2d 1008
(Wash. 1974) (holding that prohibition against marriage by same-gender couples is not gender-
based classification under the state's Equal Rights Amendment); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d
952,955-56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (common law marriage cannot be formed between two men). It
is noteworthy that all these decisions preceded the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
7ablocki v. Redhai, 434 US. 374 (1978), and Turnerv. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), discussed more
fully infra text accompanying notes 204-206 and 210-14.
173. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting the trial judge).
[Vol. 50:345
QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL17Y
different configuration." 4 The Hawaii court noted that this reasoning
was "tautological and circular."' 5 It is tautological and circular because
it, in effect, says that marriage is marriage, with no reference to any
definitional characteristics other than the very one that is being
questioned. As the judge in Brause wrote: "[I]t is not enough to say that
'marriage is marriage' and accept without any scrutiny the law before
the court. It is the duty of the court to do more than merely assume that
marriage is only, and must only be, what most are familiar with."176
Thus, the Act cannot avoid constitutional analysis by defining marriage
in a certain way any more than the Virginia courts could avoid equal
protection analysis by defining marriage a certain way in Loving.
In sum, the Act creates a gender-based classification by forbidding
people of the same gender to many. As such, it is subject to the standard
of review that applies to gender-based classifications.
3. Applicable Standard of Review
The issue of the level of scrutiny to be applied to gender-based
classifications under federal law has been the subject of much Supreme
Court jurisprudence.1" The most recent decision is United States v.
Virginian1 7 requiring the men-only Virginia Military Institute (VNM to
admit women. In that case, Justice Ginsberg wrote, repeating language
from Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,t 79 that gender-based
classifications must be based on an "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tionf" to be constitutional. She also reiterated the familiar, "intermedi-
ate scrutiny" standard that gender-based classifications must "serve
important governmental objectives" and that the discriminatory means
employed must be "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives" '  Justice Rehnquist concurred, specifying that intermediate
scrutiny applied, and that the "exceedingly persuasive justification"
language referenced by Justice Ginsberg did not change the applicable
intermediate scrutiny standard." Justice Scalia dissented, accusing the
174. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44.63 (Haw. 1993) (citations omitted).
175. Id.
176. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-0562 CL 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
177. See United States v. Vrginia, 116S. CL 2264(1996); Fnticro v. Rich rdson. 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Craig v. Born, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Baehr v. Lewin, the Haw-aii Supreme Court
intepreted its Equal Rights Amendment and decided that strict scrutiny was the appropriatm leel
of scrutiny for gender-based classifications. See Baehr v. Lzwin, 852 P.2d at 63-64.
178. 16 S. CLt.2264 (1996).
179. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
180. United States v. Virginia. 116 S. CL at 2274-75 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Wome
v. Hogan, 458 US. at 724).
181. Id. at 2275 (quotingWengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142. 150 (1980)).
182. See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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majority of instituting strict scrutiny without saying.so"' While the
Supreme Court's opinion in Virginia is not crystal-clear, it does seem
that the level of scrutiny of gender-based classifications has been
heightened by the Virginia decision, although it may not be at the level
of strict scrutiny.' As the result in Virginia suggests, an "exceedingly
persuasive justification"'85 may be more difficult for the state to
establish, than a standard requiring simply "important governmental
objectives" and discriminatory means which are "substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives."' 86 Debate is likely to continue
as to whether this is strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or something
in between, but it is at least intermediate scrutiny and arguably some-
thing more.
Maine courts must follow federal equal protection law, but it is
instructive to review the Law Court's treatment of gender-based
classifications since the Law Court's jurisprudence has been forward-
thinking in this area. The Law Court generally has applied intermediate
scrutiny to gender-based governmental actions since 1978.187 As noted
above, the standard formulation of intermediate scrutiny is that a
classification subject to it must be substantially related to an important
governmental objective.s For example, in State v. Rundlett,8 9 the court
upheld a gender-specific statutory rape law challenged on state and
federal constitutional grounds in a decision that predated the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County.'9° The justification of deterring unwanted teen pregnancy and
preventing injury to female teens from premature sexual intercourse was
sufficient to support the gender specificity of the statute. 9 ' In State v.
Houston,1" the Law Court's most recent decision reviewing gender-
based government actions, the court also applied intermediate scrutiny,
183. See id at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minima//sn, 66 GEO. WASH. L REV. 298,302 (1998); Eric J. Stockel, Note, U.S. v. Virginia: Does
Intermediate Scrutiny Still Exist?, 13 TOURO L REV. 229, 257 (1996); Karen L Kupetz, Note,
Equal Benefits, Equal Burdens: 'Skeptical Scutiny"for Gender Classifications After United States
v. Vrgnia, 30 LoY. LA. L REv. 1333,1371 (1997); Yanet Perez, Note, Women Win the War at
VMI, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 233,278-79 (1997).
185. United States v. Virginia, 116S. CL at 2276.
186. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
187. See State v. RundlM 391 A.2d 815,818 (Me. 1978) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
at 197); see also State v. Houston, 534 A.2d 1293, 1296 (Me. 1987).
188. See id.; see also State v. Houston, 534 A.2d at 1296.
189. 391 A.2d 815 (Me. 1978).
190. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
191. See State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d at 819; see also Michael M. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. at 470.
192. 534 A.2d 1293 (Me. 1987).
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and struck down on state and federal constitutional grounds a sentence
that the court deemed gender-discriminatory.193
Prior to Rwzdett, the court in Beal v. Beal" applied rational basis
scrutiny to a state statute that provided that alimony could only be
ordered for women, finding it unacceptable under the state and federal
constitutions. 9 The court thus did not need to reach the issues of
whether gender is a suspect classification and the degree of scrutiny
appropriate to gender-based classifications.19' The court found that
administrative convenience was not a sufficient basis for perpetuating
sex discrimination." This important decision also correctly anticipated
the Supreme Court's decision the next year striking down a gender-
specific alimony provision in Orr v. Orr" on equal protection
grounds.' It also demonstrates a Mainejudicial tradition of examining
gender-based classifications skeptically, even using rational basis
scrutiny. Maine's Constitution, as noted above, broadly forbids
"discrimination" in the "exercise of civil rights," as well as forbidding
"equal protection" violations, so Maine could provide more exacting
scrutiny of gender-based classifications than is required by federal
law. 1
193. See id. at 1296 (holding that the sentencing judge's general policy of applying a
minimum two-day jail term of assault when the defendantfassailant was male and the victim was
female was a violation of defendant's equal protection rights).
194. 388 A.2d 72 (Me. 1978).
195. See id. at 74-75.
196. See ih at74.
197. See i&
198. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
199. See id. at 271. In Orrv. O, the Supreme Court applied intermedt scrutiny to the
classification at issue. See i& at 279.
200. See Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d at 74. Administrative convenlence or reduction of
administrative costs is filquently a legitimate state intert See Developments in the Law: The
Constido and the Family, supra note 101, at 120001, yt in Bea, administrative convenience
was rejected as a valid rationale.
Maine has had several cases involving men and women's prisons t=erc men
unsuccessfully claimed sex discriination. In these cases mal prisoners claiming s
dscrimination since escaping from prisons where men wer held were treated more seriously than
those male prisoners escaping from prisons %b rrenwereheld. See, e.g.. State v. Emery. 357
A.2d 878 (Me. 1976); Wark v. Robbins. 458 F.2d 1295 (D. Me. 1972); Wark v. State. 266 A.2d 62
(Me. 1970). cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970). These challges v=ee unsuccessfu; men and
women v we not sirailady situated since othe differences in addition to gender differentiated them
for example. in War, men and women wer in different institutions which were designed for
differetpurposes. See Wmkv. Robbins. 458 F.2d at 1298. Thecases should not ps ae problema
in this context because the only difference between the sexes set forth in the Act is the text of the
Act itself, but for his gender, a male could marry a male.
201. See supra Part lV.B.
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C. Fundamental Rights Analysis
1. The Fundamental Right of Marriage
The freedom to marry is recognized by the United States Supreme
Court as of fundamental importance. For example, in Loving, the United
States Supreme Court held that miscegenation laws arbitrarily deprived
the Lovings of the freedom to marry, which was a fundamental liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause. 2 The Court wrote: 'The freedom
to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is
one of the basic 'civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence
and survival." In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court struck down a state
law which effectively prohibited indigent, non-custodial parents from
remarrying, stating that "our past decisions make clear that the right to
marry is of fundamental importance."'  The Court concluded, after
reviewing its history of protection of the marriage right, that the law,
because it interfered directly and substantially with the right of a class
of people to marry, could only be upheld if supported by sufficiently
important state interests, and if narrowly tailored to effectuate those
interests? °5 The law failed to meet that test.
2°6
The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 2  declared, striking
down a criminal anticontraception law:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
202. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The Supreme Court first referred to
marriage as fundamental in Skinner v. Oklahoma: "We are dealing here with legislation which
involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that
Oklahoma's law requiring sterilization of some criminals but not others violates.Equal Protection
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
203. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 541). The
Loving Court also struck down the statute on equal protection grounds. See id at 11-12; see also
supra Part V.B.
204. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,383 (1970).
205. See id at 387-88.
206. The law failed to meet that test for several reasons. If the goal of the law was collecting
child support, other means of collecting child support were available that did not infringe on the
marriage right. See id. at 389-90. Also, if the goal was preventing non-custodial parents from
incurring new child support obligations, the law was underinclusive, since such parents could incur
other new obligations of any sort other than those arising from marriage. See id. at 390. The law
was overinclusive too, since a new spouse might improve a non-custodial parent's finances. See
i 8
207. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.0
Griswold reflects a notion of privacy in relationships beyond simply
individual privacy.
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court case on the right to marry is
Turner v. Safley, in which the court struck down a prison regulation
restricting prisoners' right to marry? The Court held that prisoners
retained the right to marry set forth in Zablocki, subject to substantial
restrictions as a result of incarceration, but that "[mI]any important
attributes of marriage remain, however, after taking into account the
limitations imposed by prison life." ' The attributes of marriage that
remained included the following-
First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional
support and public commitment. These elements are an important and
significant aspect of the marital relationship. In addition, many
religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for some
inmates and their spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may
be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal
dedication. Third, most inmates eventually will be released by parole
or commutation, and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in
the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated.
Finally, marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of
government benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights
(e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less
tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born out of wedlock).
These incidents of marriage, like the religious and personal aspects of
the marriage commitment, are unaffected by the fact of confinement
or the pursuit of legitimate corrections goals. 2
In Turner, the Court struck down the restrictions on the right to many as
not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectivesP3 The
Court's description of the attributes of marriage focuses on the emo-
tional, spiritual, and financial aspects of marriage; Justice O'Connor
notes that consummation is not an essential aspect of marriage, showing
that the constitutionally protected right to marry is not based on the
ability to procreate within that relationship
t 4
These federal cases recognize that there is a fundamental right to
marry. Not all restrictions on the right to marry are subject to strict
scrutiny, however-in Zablocki, the Court wrote that 'reasonable
208. Id. at 486.
209. Also, it is inte~esting tornote that in Griwold, by striking down h annutic-t,.mpon
law, the Court was protecting a maried couple's right not to procreat.
210. Turnerv. Safley, 482 U.S. 78.99-100 (1987).
211. Id. at 95.
212. Id. at 95-96.
213. Seeid at96-99.
214. See id at 95-96.
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regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed."2 "5 However, as
we have seen, heightened scrutiny applies to some marriage-related
classifications.216
The Maine Constitution also provides an independent basis for
recognition of the fundamental right to marry in its natural rights clause.
Article 1, section 1 of the Maine Constitution-provides:
All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and
protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness.
217
While there is little Mainecase law under this provision,28 the right to
marry may be deemed part of each person's inherent and inalienable
right to pursue happiness under this provision 19 The Kentucky
Supreme Court found that its almost identically worded constitutional
provision was a basis for holding that a right of privacy existed under the
Kentucky Constitution that was broader than the federal privacy right.P0
Moreover, Article 1, section 6-A of the Maine Constitution protects
"civil rights" and forbids "discrimination" against anyone in the
"enjoyment" or "exercise thereof. ''  Since, as the Loving court noted,
marriage is "one of the 'basic civil rights of man,"'  this provision may
provide an additional basis, under the state constitution, for holding that
marriage is a fundamental right.
Thus, individuals possess an inherent, fundamental, constitutional
right to marry. m Restrictions which directly and substantially burden
215. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,386 (1978).
216. Id. at 387-88.
217. Me. Const. art. L § 1.
218. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
219. Cf. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 129 Me. 24,25, 149 A. 572, 573 (1930).
220. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Ky. 1993) (holding sodomy
statute unconstitutional as denial of equal protection principles and right to privacy under state
constitution). New Jersey also held that its almost'identical constitutional provision embraces a
right to privacy. See Greenberg v. Kinmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 304 (NJ. 1985); see also FRYSEN,
supra note 26, § 2-2(b), at 70 n.20. Maine has not developed a significant jurisprudence on the
right to privacy under the state constitution.
221. Me. Const. art.1 § 6-A.
222. Loving v. Virginia. 388 US. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942)).
223. It is somewhat uncleaiwhether, under prior Maine statutes before passage of the Act,
couples of the same gender could claim a right to marry. Prior law did not explicitly bar marriage
by same-gender couples. However, the consanguinity restrictions, ME REV. SrAT. ANN. tit. 19-A.
§ 701(2) (West 1998), seem to contemplate opposite sex marriage. If such a claim had been brought
prior to the passage of the Act, principles of statutory interpretation would have had to be used to
interpret whether the existing statutes barred marriage by same-gender couples and, if so, whether
that ban was constitutional. The constitutional principles and broader policies enunciated in this
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the right to marry must be justified by sufficiently important state
interests and must be closely tailored to effectuate only those interests?'
2. Applicable Standard of Review
The Act places a direct and substantial burden on the right to marry,
and as such is subject to heightened scrutiny under Zablocki. The Act
states that persons of the same gender may not marry at allm which is
a direct and substantial burden placed on persons who might want to
marry someone of the same gender. In addition, the Act provides that
certain marriages, legal when entered into by the participants in other
states, are void in Maine. This also directly and substantially burdens
those persons who are participants in such marriages.P
The Act is radically different from other provisions of Maine law
which regulate marriage. For example, the Maine statutes list a number
of categories of people who can solemnize marriages and list require-
mentst ' and procedures" 0 for licenses. These types of regulations are
incidental regulations that do not significantly interfere with the decision
to many, and thus are subject to rational basis scrutiny under Zablocki.?
In sum, heightened scrutiny would be applied to the Act because it
directly and substantially interferes with the fundamental right to marry.
D. Sexual Orientation Protected Class Analysis
1. The Sexual Orientation Classification of the Act
A third theory which supports the conclusion that heightened scrutiny
should be applied to the Act is that it classifies on the basis of sexual ori-
entation and such classifications should be accorded heightened scrutiny.
Article, Ibelieve, mean that maniage should not be limited to couples of the opposite sex, even in
the absence of the Act.
224. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374.387-88 (1978).
225. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(5) (West 1998).
226. See id § 701(1-A).
227. Given that the right to many is fundamental heghtened scrutiny would beI applied to
challenges to the provisions of Maine law limiting marriage on the basis of consanguinity.
polygamy, and mental disability, since those provisions directly and substantially interfe-e w-ith the
right to marry. For fuarther analysis, see Developmenw in the Law--The Constitution and the
Family, supra note 101, at 1248-64; see also Maura L Strassberg Discns of Form or
Substance: Monogamy. Polygamy and Same-sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L REV. 1502 G99).
228. Title 19-A, § 665(l)(A) of the Main: Revised Statutes lists justice or judge., la yer,
justice ofthepeace, ornotarypublic. See ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A. § 655(IXA) (West 1998);
Section 655(1)(B) lists mlsters, clerics, and persns licensed to preach by a church or
ecclesiastical body. See id § 655(1)(B). Section 658 lists Qu k= and membe of the Baha'i fath
who solemnize marriages according to the practice of those faiths. See id. § 658.
229. See id § 656.
230. See id. § 652.
231. 434 U.s. 374,386(1978).
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The effect of the statute is to prohibit'gay men from marrying each
other, and similarly to forbid lesbians from marrying each other. For
example, the Act states that one of its purposes is "to support and
strengthen traditional monogamous Maine families against improper
interference from out-of-state influences and edicts." 2  The "out-of-state
edict' which may "improperly influence" Maine is the Hawaii Supreme
Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin, according to the sponsors of the
intiative. 3 Baehr is widely recognized as a case about marriage by gay
couples.' Although the Act also conceivably could disadvantage other
marriages," 5 its primary effect is to prohibit marriages by same-gender
couples. That this is the sole aim of the Act is also shown by the
summary of the bill, which states only that the Act "prohibits persons of
the same sex from contracting marriage." 6 Thus, it is clear that the
statute creates a classification aimed to exclude gay men and lesbians
from marriage.
2. Standard of Review for Classifications Based
on Sexual Orientation
Various state and federal courts have held that classifications on the
basis of sexual orientation should be given heightened scrutiny;' others
232. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 650(C) (West 1998).
233. See supra note 78.
234. See, e.g., Paul Carrier, Maine Group Seeks to Ban Gay Wedlock, PORTLAND PRESS
HERA, May 2, 1996, at 1.
235. For example, many states including Rhode Island allow first cousin marriages. See R.L
GEN. LAws §§ 15-1-1, 15-1-2 (1996). Maine only allows such marriages if a physician has
provided genetic counseling. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(2)(B) (West 1998). Thus,
theoretically, if a fi t cousin couple married in Rhode Island moves to Maine, their marriage would
be void. However, it is implausible that they would ever be detected; for example, no proof relating
to consanguinity is required when couples apply for a marriage license.
236. LD. 1017 (118th Legis. 1997); see Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d
218, 223 (1981) (noting that statement of fact attached to legislative document is a "proper and
compelling aid" in determining legislative intent); see also State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 157
(1991) (same).
237. See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that gay
men and lesbians are a suspect class and a law conditioning their retention in military service on
non-disclosure of their sexual orientation is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487,500-02
(Ky. 1992) (holding that sexual orientation discrimination must be based on a substantial
governmental interest and a law criminalizing same-gender sodomy was unconstitutional under state
constitution); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), (holding that Army
regulations barring homosexuals fiom military service violated equal protection), reh'g granted, 847
F.2d 1362 (1988) (en banc), 875 F.2d 699,725 (9th Cir. 1989) (cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990);
Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Ca. 1979) (holding
that the state constitution's equal protection provision barred the public utility from discriminating
against homosexual employees); see also Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d
1 (D.C. 1987).
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have held that only rational basis review applies. Numerous commen-
tators have argued that heightened scrutiny should apply to classifica-
tions on the basis of sexual orientation and that gay men and lesbians
should be considered a "suspect class." 9 The Supreme Court has stated
that-
[A] suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such
a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process."... [These groups
have] been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities . '
The Court has further explained the idea behind treating some classifica-
tions as "suspect" as follows:
Some, classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated
prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily
recognized as incompatible with the constitutional understanding that
each person is to bejudged individually and is entitled to equal justice
under the law. Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant
to any proper legislative goal.... The experience of our Nation has
shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some
groups. Our response to that experience is reflected in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"4'
238. Sawe. g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Offim, 895 F.2d 563.57-73
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that homosexuality is not a class subject to heightened scrutiny und the
Federal Constitution); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454. 464 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that
heightened scrutiny is reserved for equal protection challenges based on race, alienage, national
origin, gender, or illegitimacy); Padula v. Webster. 822 F.2d 97, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding
that homosexuality was not a suspect class under the federal guarantee of equal protection).
239. See, e.g., Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientaon: Hornosexualty as a
Suspect Claricaion, 98 HARv. L REv. 1285 (1985); Harris M. Miller , Note, An Aruanentfor
the Applcatioi of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classificatfons Based on Hormoseka-
iEy, 57 S. CAT- L REv. 797 (1984); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products. 98 HARV. L
REv. 713,740-46 (1985); LAURENCEH TRIBE, AMEaCAN CoNni0, LLAW 1427 (1988).
240. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307.313 (1976) (quoting San
Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 28 (1973)).
241. Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 n.14 (1982) (citations omitted). TbCourtdcideddnot
to designate 'Uilegal aliens" as a suspect cla but struck down a state law vithtolding education
funding for the benefit of children not legally admitted into the United States. See id at 223.7Th
Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) d-rbed
the previously established suspect classifications of ram alienage, and national origin as follows
Tlese factors are so seldom f.levant to the achievement of any legitimate state inteest
that laws grounded in such considerations am deemed to refle prejudice and
antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or desmving as
others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikrly to be soon
rectified by legislative mea, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and uill be
sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest
Id. at 440.
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From the applicable Supreme Court precedents, there are three criteria
for heightened scrutiny: first, historical disadvantage-," second, a lack
of relation between the "ability to perform or contribute to society" and
the trait defining the group; 3 and third, a position of relative political
powerlessness within the majoritarian legislative sphere.4 As discussed
below, all three of these criteria are present regarding gay men and
lesbians; therefore, heightened scrutiny should apply under federal and
state law.? 5
Because Maine's Constitution has an explicit equal protection
clause,' constitutional language protecting civil rights and prohibiting
discrimination,' and a natural rights provision, there is a basis for
holding that sexual orientation is a suspect classification under Maine
law even if federal courts do not do the same. 9 In Solmitz v. Maine Sch.
Administrative Dist. Number 59, the Law Court left open the possibil-
ity that sexual orientation could be considered a suspect classification
under state law?.'
242. This means whether the group has been burdened with "purposeful unequal treatment"
or subjected to "disabilities on the basis ofstereotyped characteristics" and hostility. See, e.g., City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc, 473 U.S. at 440; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 28.
243. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc., 473 U.S. at 440.41.
244. See San Antonio Indep. SCh. Dist v. Rodriquez, 411 US. at 23; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
at 216-17 n.14.
245. Justice Brennan agreed that gay men and lesbians satisfy the criteria for heightened
scrutiny:
[Homosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of this country's population.
Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals
once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue
their rights openly in the political arena. Moreover, homosexuals have historically been
the object of pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination
against homosexuals is "likely... to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than ...
rationality." State action taken against members of such groups based simply on their
status as members of the group traditionally has been subjected to strict, or at least
heightened, scrutiny by this Court.
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cer. denied, 470 U.S. 1009,
1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting (citations omitted)).
246. Me. Const. art. L § 6-A.
247. Id. ("No person shall... be denied the enjoyment of his civil rights or be discriminated
against in the exercise thereof.").
248. Id. art. L § 1.
249. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (holding that protections
of homosexuals under the Kentucky Constitution are more extensive than under the Federal
Constitution).
250. 495 A.2d 812 (1985).-
251. See id at 820. In Solmitz, the court held that even if the lesbian speaker scheduled to
speak at a cancelled school Tolerance Day event was a member of a protected class, her rights were
not violated because the entire event was cancelled. See id at 820-21. In State v. Rush, 324 A.2d
748 (Me. 1974), the Law Court rejected poverty as a suspect classification, following the Supreme
Court's lead in Rodriquez. See id at 756-57 (referring to San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)).
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Gay men and lesbians meet the criteria for a suspect classification.
First, gay men and lesbians have historically been, and continue to be, a
disadvantaged group against which there has been and continues to be a
great deal of prejudice, as the Law Court' and others2  have noted.
Thus, the first criterion is satisfied. Second, the trait of being gay or
lesbian has nothing to do with an individual's ability to participate in and
contribute to society zs It has nothing to do with an individual's ability
to perform on the job3P It has nothing to do with an individual's ability
to participate in a committed relationship, to share, or to love.2 5 It has
nothing to do with an individual's ability to raise children." Third,
Maine's lesbian and gay citizens are a minority, which, because of
historical discrimination and prejudice, is not sufficiently protected by
252. The Law Court has noted that "the existence of anti-homosexual bias in our society
requres voir dire directed at such prejudice if the evidence [in a criminal trial] might suggest that
the defendant is homosexuaL" State v. Lambert, 528 A.2d 890, 892 (Me. 1987) (citing State v.
Lovely, 451 A.2d 900 (Me. 1982)).
253. See, e.g., Able v. United State 968 F. Supp. 850, 852-55 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Evan
Wolfson, Civi Rights, Human Righs, Gay Rights: Minorit es and the Hur.wiy of the Differemt,
14 HARV. J.. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 30-33 (1991); Gregory IM. Hezek, Myihs about Sexual
Orientation: A Lavyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 LAW & S-X 133.142-43 (1991);
Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, I02 HARV.L REV. 1503 (1989); Not
The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classificarlan, 98
HARV. L REV. 1285,1286 (1985); Alan Wolfe, The Homosexual Exception, N.Y. Tvas, Feb. 8,
1998 (Magazine), at 46. This is not to say the type of disadvantage expeuienced by gay me and
lesbians is similar to the type of disadvantages experienced by racial minorities. There am many
important differences and each is sui generis.
254. In 1973, the American Psychological Association and the American Ps)cbiaic
Association rejected the notion ofhnoseality as a mental Hiness stating that "(h]omoscxuality,
per se, inplies no impairment injudg=t stability, e.licbflity, or g rals s or vocational cap-
ablities." JohnJ. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Associati, Iacorporated.
for the Year 1974, AM. PSYCHOLOGIwr, June 1975. at 620; see also American Ps)yhiaadc
Association, Gay andLesbian Issues (visited Apr. 24.1998) <http'/lwww.Myc.orglpublic..info
HOMOS'I1nIMr>.
255. See Gary B. MeltonPublicPolicy and Private Prejudice, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Jun:
1989, at 933 ("Gay people have an overall potential to contribute to society similar to that of
heterosexual people, including in the workplace."); Herek supra note 253, at 138-148(1991).
256. See Herek, supra note 253, at 161 (1991); see also supra note 15.
257. See Baehrv.Jfike, No.91-1394.1996 WL694235, at *21 (Haw. Civ. CL Dec. 3,1996)
("Defendant has failed to present sufficient credible evidence Wich demonstratcs that the public
interest in the well-being of children... or the optimal development of children ould be adverDely
affected by same-sex marriage."). An increasingly large body of rmea=ch demonstrales that childr
of same-sex couples are not harmed by being raised by same%- couples and, in fact, do as well
as chldren raised in other settings. See, eg., AMEtRCAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIA0., LmmAN
AND GAY PARENTNG 2-3 (1995); Mike Allen & Nancy BurrelL Comparing the Impact of
Homosexual and Heterosexual Parents on Children. Meta.Analysis of Existing Research, 32(2)
J. HoMosExuALTry 19,30 (1996); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lebian and Gay Parents,
63 CHIDDEV. 1025 (1992); FaMMECKW. BOZErr, GAY AD I.sIAN PARBMrs (1987); Susan
Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent Households: Psryhosaexal and
Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL AND PSYCHIATRY 551 (1983); IONAL.TAsEI &
SUSAN GOILOMBOK, GROWING UP IN A LESBIAN FAMILY 135-36 (1997).
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the political process. 8  The voters' February 1998 repeal of the
amendment to the Maine Human Rights Act that had extended civil
rights protection to gay men and lesbians may demonstrate this.P9 In the
campaign, a major spokesperson for the repeal argued explicitly that
landlords and employers should be able to discriminate against gay men
and lesbians2P° Under these circumstances, classifications on the basis
of sexual orientation should be given heightened scrutiny.
E. Application of Heightened Scrutiny
Under any of the three theories outlined above, gender-based
classification, fundamental right to marry, or protected classification, the
Act must satisfy heightened scrutiny. There are various permutations of
heightened scrutiny, as the reader has perceived.26' In any version, the
258. Arguments about "immutability" of sexual orientation tend to surface in this area. Some
claim that homosexuality is not an "immutable" characteristic, that it is simply a behavior choice,
and as such ther should not be anti-discriminaton protections. This argument is rather beside the
point for several reasons. Frrst, a trait need not be immutable for classifications which burden the
group to obtain heightened judicial scrutiny. For example, distinctions based on allenage receive
heightened scrutiny, yet alien status is often within the control of the individual. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The Supreme Court has never held that immutability is a
necessary preequisite for heightened scrutiny. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432 n.10 (1985). The causes of sexual orientation are unknown. There is some evidence that for
some it may be genetic. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 101 (1992). As Professor Laurence
Tribe notes, sexual orientation (whether heterosexual or homosexual) is often very important to
individuals' identities and if it is changeable at all, it is very difficult to change. See TRME, supra
note 88, at 1616. Whatever the origins of sexual orientation are, what should be most critical for
equal protection analysis is the lack of correlation between the sexual orientation of being gay or
lesbian and an ability to perform in society. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the
Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from limmutability, 46 STAN. L REV. 503 (1994)
(noting the dangers of resting heightened scrutiny on scientific evidence of genetic origins of sexual
orientation).
259. Peter Pochna, Repeal Prevails: Conservatives Score a Dramatic Victory as Voters
Overturn Maine's Gay-Rights Law, PORTLAAND PRESS HERAL., Feb. 11, 1998, at Al.
260. Michael Heath, Executive Director of the Maine Christian Civic League, wrote in a
November 1997 fndraising letter:.
We believe that it IS appropriate to discriminate against people if they are wrong. We
believe that this is especially true for the small businessman and landlord. They should
be afforded the freedom to make decisions for themselves, unless the cumulative effect
of their decisions causes widespread social problems for people. If a Maine
businessman or landlord wants to discriminate against a person because of their sexual
orientation, they should be able to do so.
Bill Nemitz, Heath Knows How Jesus Would Vote, PORTI.AND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 9,1998, at B I
(quoting fundraising letter of Michael Heath).
261. In a nutshell, the standard for gender-based classifications is that they must further
"important governmetal objectives," the means employed must be "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives" and "[t]he justification must be genuine." United States v.
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) (citations omitted). See supra Part V.B. For restrictions
that directly and substantially burden the right to marry, they must be based on "sufficiently
important state interests" and be "closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 US. 374,388 (1978); see supra Part V.C. For heightened scrutiny based on protected
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Act's restrictions must be supported by important state interests and must
be narrowly tailored to further only those interests or be substantially
related to furtherance of those interests. Throughout this analysis, it is
critical to keep in mind the Supreme Court's statement in Palmore v.
Sidoti,?' responding to private racial prejudice, that "[t]he Constitution
cannot control [private racial] prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect."
1. Important or Compelling State Interests
To satisfy heightened scrutiny, the Act's restrictions must further at
least an "important state interest! '  Since no litigation has been filed,
it is difficult to predict what "important interese' the state might proffer
if the Act was challenged. Hawaii's litigation may offer some guidance.
In Baehr, the trial court on remand was required to apply strict
scrutiny, which meant that the state had to establish that the marriage
ban furthered a "compelling state interest" and to prove that the law was
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of constitutional
rights." The state tried to establish at trial that the marriage ban
furthered various compelling state interests, such as the need to protect
traditional marriage as the fundamental structure in society, the interest
in "fostering procreation within a marital setting," and the interest in
"protecting the health and welfare of children and other persons."
However, after a trial replete with expert testimony, the court found that
the state "has not demonstrated a basis for its claim of the existence of
compelling state interests sufficient to justify withholding the legal status
of marriage from [p]laintiffs '2  and that the "[d]efendant has failed to
present sufficient credible evidence which demonstrates that the public
interest in the well-being of children and families, or the optimal
classifications, strict scrutiny should apply so that the classification must =-ar a compelling
governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to forther only that ieres See Watkins v. U.S.
Army 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988); supra Part V).
262. 466 US. 429 (1984).
263. Id at433. inPanore, a child's parents had divorced aid the moth=r.wo hzd custody.
began living with a black man. The lower court transferred the child to the fathers custody, partly
in view of the potential stigmatization she might face from others, coming from a mixed rce
household. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision because of the improper role
that raceplayedinit. See i& at434.
264. See supra note 261.
265. See supra note S.
266. SeeBaehrv. Lewin, 852P.2d44,68 (Haw. 1993). TheHawaii SupremeCourt's opinion
put the burden of proof on the defendant to show that the act was constitutional. See id.
267. Baehrv. Mike, CIVNo. 91-1394,1996WL694235. at '3 (Haw. Cir. CL Dec. 3,1996)
(quoting Defendant's First Amended Pretrial Statement, May 13.1996).
268. Id.
269. Id at *21.
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development of children, would be adversely affected by same-sex
marriage. 2 70 This ruling, as mentioned above, is on appeal.27'
In considering what important state interest might be the basis of the
Act's restrictions, one could simply say that the state always has an
important interest in regulating marriage since marriage regulation is
considered to be within the police powers of the state.2 2 However, the
important state interest that is furthered by the particular classification
at issue must be articulated more specifically?" For the state to defend
a claim of unconstitutionality, it must be possible to articulate the interest
at stake. The state would have to show that it has an important interest
in limiting the gender of couples who marry, for some particular
reason? 7 Such a reason appears difficult to articulate or justify without
relying on animus towards gay men and lesbians, which should no longer
be considered an acceptable basis for legislation?"
The Act itself lists two "compelling state interests" in its findings.
The first is "to nurture and promote the unique institution of traditional
monogamous marriage in the support of harmonious families and the
physical and mental health of children." 6 The second is that: "[tjhe
state has the2 compelling interest in promoting the moral values
inherent in traditional monogamous marriage." The Act never defines
270. Id,
271. Alaska will also have to defend its maniage ban as based on a compelling state interest
according to the superior court's decision in Brause. See Brause v. Alaska Bureau of Vital
Statistics, 3AN-95-0562CI 1998 WL 88743, at *13 (Alas. Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
272. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1966).
273. For example, in Zablocki, the state argued that two interests were served by the
challenged law-, first, the law gave the state the opportunity to counsel the would-be marriage
entrant; second, the law protected the welfare of children not in the custody of a biological parent.
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). The Court's analysis seemed to assume that
these interests were important or at least legitimate but that the statute lacked the necessary fit
between means and ends. See id. at 388-90.
274. In applying intermediate scrutiny, courts often limit their review to the rationale actually
advanced by th" state, refusing to supply their own rationales. Another technique used in
intermediate scrutiny is to reject after-the-fact rationalizations and instead look lt the reasons for
the rule at the time of its enactment. See TiMF, supra note 88,1604-06; see also Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan. 458 U.S. 718,730 (1982); United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275
(1996) ("rhe justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented past hoc in response to
litigation."). See supra Part V.F.
275. See Romerv. Evans, 116S. CL 1620, 1628-29 (1996); see also supra Part V.F.l. The
actual purpose and history of the legislation is an important part of this inquiry. While in statutory
interpretation cases courts generally analyze legislative history and legislative intent only when there
is an ambiguity in the statutory language, see O'Neal v. City of Augusta, 1998 ME 48, 4, 706
A.2d 1042, 1043-44, in equal protection cases, legislative intent is generally critical to the inquiry.
See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see generally Andrew Koppelman, Rotter v. Evans
and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY B.L RTS. J. 89 (1997).
276. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650(1)(A) (West 1998).
277. It is not clear why this word is "the." It would seem that "a" would be more appropriate
because "the" implies that there is only one compelling state interest. and the statute itself lists two.
278. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650(l)(A) (West 1998).
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"traditional,monogamous marriage"; nor does it define what "moral
values" are "inherent in" such a marriage. These "compelling state
interests" appear to be listed in the Act to present a justification for it if
it is challenged. A challenger might claim that the Act violates his
fundamental right to marry. The state's response could be that it is
justified by either or both of these stated "compelling state interests.'
But the legislature cannot force a court to defer to an unconstitutional
statute by defining something as a "compelling state interest." In City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt by Congress to
control the standard of review that would be applied to determine
whether certain state actions were constitutionalP The Maine
legislature, by declaring certain "compelling state interests," is trying
also to control the nature of review that courts would give the Act.
However, determining constitutionality is a task for the courts7P In
addition, these interests are simply too amorphous to be defined as
important or compelling for constitutional purposes. They also are not
direttly related to the exclusion, as discussed below38'
The Law Court has identified various interests as "compelling state
interests" but has not discussed in detail what constitutes "important
state interests." Compelling state interests identified include providing
ajury trial, prohibiting sale and use of illegal drugsP freedom of reli-
gion, s ensuring that all citizens are adequately educated, avoiding the
appearance of coercion which results in every solicitation on behalf of
law enforcement agents s conserving natural resources such as clamsP
and free exercise of speech s
279. 117 S. CL 2127,2170 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Resration Act. hIich
required government actions that infinged on religion to be justified by strict scrutiny.
unconstitational).
280. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1 Cranch) (1803).
281. See Part V.E.2.
282. See Butlerv. Supreme Judicial Court. 611 A.2d 987.992 (Me. 1992) (holding that the
state can impose a fee on litigants demanding jury trial).
283. See Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 66 (Me. 1992) (holding that the city can
retain pipe that citizen claims is used for religious use of marijuana in view of sta interest in
preventing illegal drug use).
284. SeeBlountv. DepartmentofEduc.andCltural Serv, 551 A.2d 1377,1381 (Me. 1988)
(stating that freedom of religion and education are compelling state interests, and upholding the
state's home schooling plan despite religious objections).
285. See id
286. See State v. Main State Troope Ass'n. 491 A.2d 538,542-43 (Me. 1985) (holding that
the ban on solicitation by troopers based on a compelling state intmst of avoiding appearance of
coercion satisfies Frst Amendment).
287. See State v. Norton, 335 A.2d 607, 615 (Me. 1975) (finding that a compelling stat
interest in clam conservation justifies regulation distinguishing bem residents and non-residents
of town).
288. See Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d 18. 21 (ble. 1973) (opining that propoed




In several cases, the Law Court has rejected so-called "compelling
state interests" that government entities put forward to justify their
actions. For example, a speech restriction that applied to a union was
struck down in Association of Independent Professionals v. Maine Labor
Relations Board38 9 The state claimed that the "compelling state interest"
that justified the restriction was preserving labor peace and avoiding
disruption of public educational institutions through labor activity.2
The court found that these could be compelling state interests, but that
the state had not shown in this case that they actually were compelling. '
In a 1973 Opinion of the Justices,2" the court found that interference
with the right to vote through residency requirements had to be justified
by a compelling state interest, and where the only state interest was the
administrative task of registration, the interference had to be limited.293
In sum, the Act's declarations of "compelling state interests" do not
mean that the Act furthers an actual, compelling, or important state
interest. Further, given the nature of previously recognized compelling
state interests, it is unlikely that the state could show that the Act's
restriction, which simply excludes and disadvantages lesbians and gay
men, furthers a compelling or sufficiently important state interest.2"
2. The "Narrow Tailoring" or "Substantial Relationship"
Requirement
Let us assume for the purposes of discussion that the Act's exclusion
furthers important or compelling state interests, such as "promoting the
moral values inherent in traditional monogamous marriage" set forth in
the Act or some other analogous broad goal. The next question is
whether it is "closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."295 In
Baehr v. Miike, the trial court concluded that even if the state had shown
that banning marriage by same-gender couples furthered a compelling
state interest, the state had failed to show that the ban was "narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights."296
The problem is that the Act's wholesale ban on marriage by same-
289. 465 A.2d 401,410 (Me. 1983).
290. See id.
291. Seeid.at410-11.
292. 303 A.2d 452 (Me. 1973).
293. See idi at 456; see also Dotter v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 435 A.2d 1368
(Me. 1981) (finding that agency failed to establish a compelling state interest for denying
unemployment benefits to an employee who resigned as a result of conflict with his employer
concerning his exercise of his religion).
294. As I argue in the next section, the exclusion is not based on a legitimate state interest.
Given that this is so, it is obviously not based on an important or compelling state interest.
295. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). See supra note 261 for summaries of'
the varieties of heightened scrutiny.




gender couples cannot be narrowly tailored "to promote the moral values
... in traditional monogamous marriage"; nor can it be substantially
related to such a goal. The Act is over-inclusive in that it leaves in place
the liberal entry-into-marriage laws which allow persons to marry who
may not in any way "promote the moral values in traditional monoga-
mous marriage," as long as they are of opposite sexes.3 It is also under-
inclusive, since some couples of the same sex who marry may in fact
promote the moral values of traditional monogamous marriage, yet all
are excluded from marriage. The purported "compelling interests,"
which the Act is supposed to further, are so amorphous that it is
impossible for any law to be narrowly tailored to further only those goals
or for any law to be substantially related to those goals.
3. Te "Exceedingly Persuasive Justfication" Test
Heretofore, I have combined the discussion of the application of the
types of heightened scrutiny for the sake of simplicity. I will now turn
to the specific analytical framework of United States v. Virginia'®
because it is illuminating when applied to the gender-based aspect of the
Act. In United States v. Virginia, the defense claimed that excluding
women from the Virginia Military Institute provided educational
benefits, and that VMI would have to modify its unique educational
approach if it were to admit women."' The state claimed that inclusion
of women was contradictory to the educational mission of the institution
and would in fact "destroy" the institution. Further, the defense
argued that a separate women's college for military training was
sufficient for women, so that the presence of the men-only VMI was not
discriminatory.3
These were not sufficiently persuasive justifications for the Court? 4
The majority found that Virginia's argument that it excluded women
from VMI in order to further educational diversity was ungrounded in
the reality and history of education in Virginia, and disregarded that
supposedjustification." The separate women's college was found to be
297. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650(l)(A) (West 1998).
298. Of course, some married opposite sex couples will promote traditional moral values of
monogamous marriage and some will not. See Legis. Rec. 396 (1997) (statemrrfl of Sen. Cathcart):
I do believe in marriage but I have to point out that this is a state wher between 1990
and 1995,51% of all the homicides wer related to families, the're domestic violence
homicides. And, INould bet you, without looking at the names and cctual families, that
these were mostly homicides in traditional, monogamous families[.]
299. See infra note 261.
300. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
301. See id. at 2276.
302. See id. at 2279.
303. See i at 2282.
304. See id. at 2286-87.
305. See id at 2284.
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"no cure at all for the opportunities and advantages withheld from
women who want a VMI education and can make the grade. ' " The
implementing methodology of VMI was not "inherently unsuitable to
women" even though most women (and most men) would not want such
an education.m° The Court analyzed the question as being "whether the
State can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity,
the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords,"303
and answered this question in the negative.3"
With respect to the Act, the issue should be, to paraphrase Justice
Ginsberg, whether the state has an exceedingly persuasive justification
for denying, on the basis of gender, to people who have the will and
capacity, the responsibilities and rights that marriage uniquely affords.
Arguments parallel to Virginia's in United States v. Virginia could be
advanced to support the Act: that allowing gay men and lesbians to enter
the institution of marriage will destroy it, and that alternatives like
domestic partnership should be ufficient.31°
The Supreme Court's responses to the idea that allowing women to
enter VMI will destroy it are interesting when applied to marriage.
Virginia argued that "the adversative method of training provides
306. IL at 2286.
307. Id.at2269,2284.
308. Id at 2280.
309. Implicit in the opinion seems to be the analysis that the Court accepted the major VMI
goal of "producing citizen-soldiers" as an important state interest, but that the exclusionary practice
was deemed not substantially related to that goaL Interestingly, once Virginia lost the decision,
apparently VMI began preparing for the entry of women and, according to the New York Tmes,
preparations went well. Editorial, Women Arrive, Finally, at V.M.I., N.Y. TIME, Aug. 24, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 8000661.
310. Proponents of the Act have not argued that there should be domestic partnership instead
of marriage for gay men and lesbians, so that committed couples could take on some of the rights
and responsibilities of married people but still be excluded from the institution of marriage. In fact,
proponents of the Act mentioned their opposition to the University of Maine's domestic partnership
program. See Written testimony of Carolyn Cosby, Chairman, Concerned Maine Families, March
12, 1997. Domestic partnership programs for public and private employees have been expanding
at a rapid pace in recent years. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Comish, A More Perfect Union:
A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L REV. 1164,1164-
65 (1992); Recognizing Non-Traditional Families, Special Rep. Series on Work & Family (BNA)
No. 38 (Feb. 1991). Several Representatives appeared to mention their support for legislation
recognizing same-sex relationships but still outside the framework of marriage.
I do not believe that the current institution of marriage is the proper place for this
[recognition of same sex unions or of unions of two elderly people of opposite sexes].
I would support and I would be willing to sponsor legislation that would allow a
contracted union that is strictly civil and has limitations upon it that are similar to the
institution of marriage.
Legis. Rec. 332 (1997) (statement of Rep. Vedral). "I am also going to commit to working together
on a civil bill that will protect the rights of all because I think we have to get past the negative here."
Legis. Rec. 333 (1977) (statement of Rep. Meres). In Hawaii, a commission was appointed to study
the issue of domestic partnership for same-sex couples, and the majority of the commission
concluded that the appropriate step was to extend marriage to same-sex couples. Report of the
Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law, Dec. 8, 1996.
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educational benefits that cannot be made available, unmodified, to
women" so that inclusion of women will "destroy" the program?" The
majority found it important that all parties agreed that "some women can
meet the physical standards [VMI] now imposers] on men," and that
"VM's implementing methodology is [not] inherently unsuitable to
women."3' Given the exclusion, the remedy called for is admitting
women, even if that may result in changing aspects of VML In the
marriage context, the responses may be similar, there is nothing inherent
in marriage that justifies a categorical gender-based exclusion. Not all
gay men and lesbians will want to marry but some will and some will be
qualified for it.313 Second, even if the admission of gays and lesbians
ultimately results in changes in marriage, that does not mean that
excluding them is legal. Changing an institution is distinct from
destroying it,314 and marriage constantly changes:1s
It is critical to remember that in this analysis, the goal of the legisla-
tion cannot be the exclusion itself; rather, the goal must be distinct from
the exclusion? 6 Thus, in United States v. Virginia, it was not sufficient
for Virginia to say that the exclusion (single sex education) was in effect
the goal (single sex education). Here, the state cannot say that the
exclusion (no same gender marriage) is in effect the goal (no same
gender marriage). Such an analysis is circular. In this instance, the most
plausible reading of the statute is that the exclusion (no same gender
marriage) is identical to the goal (no same gender marriage). This is
unacceptable. However, even if we accept the purposes of the statute at
face value, the exclusion (no same gender marriage) is not narrowly
tailored or substantially related to achievement of an important govern-
ment interest (protecting and nurturing traditional monogamous Maine
families).
4. Conclusion
Heightened review of the Act is called for since the Act makes a
gender-based classification, directly and substantially burdens a
fundamental right, and is a sexual orientation-based classification. The
Act would not survive such review, since it is not based on a sufficiently
important state interest and is neither narrowly tailored to effectuate only
311. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. CL 2264. 2271 (1996) (quoting the trial courts
findings of fact).
312. Id. at2272 (quoting the lor appellate court's reasoning).
313. Eg., will meet the statutory requirements of age, not being too cloe:ly related, and so
forth. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 §§ 652, 701(2)-(5) (West 1998).
314. See supra notes 33-50.
315. See i&.
316. This is true both with respect to heightened scrutiny and rational basis s rutiny. See
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Cr. 1620, 1627 (1996); see also ifm text accompanying note 337.
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that interest nor substantially related to furthering that interest. Nor is it
based on an exceedingly persuasive justification.
F. Application of Rational Basis Scrutiny
Assuming for purposes of discussion that heightened scrutiny will not
apply to the Act, and instead that the more deferential rational basis
scrutiny is applied, the Act would not withstand even rational basis
scrutiny review.
1. More on Rational Basis Review under the Maine Constitution and
Romer v. Evans
Having provided a very brief introduction to "rational basis" scrutiny
earlier,317 I will now discuss its application to the Act. Rational basis
scrutiny applies to most statutory equal protection challenges. 18 Each
statute must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose.3 9 Statutes are presumed constitutional, and doubts about
constitutionality are resolved in favor of constitutionality.3"'
The application of the rational basis test depends upon the factual
circumstances of each case. When illegitimate state interests play a role
in a challenged classification, courts often will set these interests aside
and also carefully review other claimed interests to ensure that impermis-
sible state goals were not actually the sole basis for the classification.32'
By contrast, when a court is dealing with an economic classification and
has no reason to believe that impermissable state interests play a part in
enactment of legislation, it will supply a reason for the law if any
conceivable set of facts supports it.3" This can be seen in the Law
317. See Part f1,
318. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); McBreairty v. Commissioner of
Admin. and Fn. Sery., 663 A.2d 50, 53 (Me. 1995) (stating that the statute need only have a
rational relationship to alegitimat goal); Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Me. 1994) (same);
Dishon v. Maine State Retirement Sys., 569 A.2d 1216, 1217 (Me. 1990) (same); see also TRIME,
supra note 34, at 1439-43.
319. See Romrnv. Evans, 116 S. C. 1620, 1627 (1996). The Court seems to use legitimate
state interests, see id. at 1627, synonymously with legitimate governmental purpose, see id at 1628;
see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. at 319-20.
320. See Irish v. Gimbell, 1997 ME 50, 19, 691 A.2d 664, 673 (upholding medical
malpractice screening panel, applying a presumption in favor of constitutionality); State v. Stinson
Canning, 161 Me. 320,322 (1965).
321. See Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985). In such cases,
the Court does not on its own afterpt to conceive of a legitimate, rational explanation for the
classification, but rather considers only the government purposes put forward by the state. See, e.g.,
id. at 449-50; Zobel v. WViliams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-65 (1982); United States Dept. Of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534-38 (1973).
322. By contrast, where there is no indication that improper state purposes or irrational
prejudice played a part in the classification, the Court will examine whether "there is any reasonably
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Court's jurisprudence by contrasting Aseptic Packaging Council v.
State' with Beal v. BealV In Aseptic Packaging, where the Law Court
was dealing with an economic and environmental law concerning
recycling, it considered whether there was any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the recycling law at
issue in that case.' By contrast, in Beal v. Beal, dealing with a gender-
specific alimony law, the court noted the possibility that such a law could
be based on outmoded and improper stereotypes and looked only at the
reason proffered for it-administrative convenience-in analyzing its
constitutionality. There are indications that, at a minimum, improper
state purposes and irrational prejudice played a part in the passage of the
Act;' therefore, a court should not apply the "any conceivable state of
facts" test to it.
In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court applied rational basis scrutiny
to Amendment 2 of the Colorado Constitution and struck it down as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment'
Amendment 2 provided that no state or local government could pass or
enforce any laws banning discrimination on the basis of "homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation."  The Court found that the law was
both too broad and too narrow and was suspicious since it singled out a
single class for disfavored treatmentwhich laws rarely do.3 The Court
made the additional point that this type of law "raise[s] the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected."331 The Court further wrote that "[ilf the
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a Legitimate governmental
interest." In addition, the Supreme Court held that the state's
justifications for the law summarized below were not rationally related
to the law. The breadth of the law, and its lack of a concrete objective,
were mentioned as reasons why the requisite "fit" was lacking.1 Romer
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification," FCC v. Bcah
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993).
323. 637 A.2d 457 (Me. 1994).
324. 388 A.2d 72 (Me. 1978).
325. See Aseptic Packaging Council v. State., 637 A2d at 459 (citing FCC v. Bech
Communications, Inc., 113 S. CL 2096,2101-02 (1993)).
326. See Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d at 7S.
327. Discussed more fully iifra Part V.F.3.
328. See Romerv. Evans, 116 S. CL 1620. 1629 (1996).
329. Id at 1623.
330. See id at 1628.
331. Id.
332. Id (quoting United Startes Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
333. See id at 1628-29.
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is an important decision, but its implications are .not yet clear."
Attempting to apply Romer to the Act results in a conclusion that no
rational basis exists; there is no fit between means and ends, and the only
reason for this law is the desire to harm a politically unpopular group,
which is not a legitimate governmental interest.
335
As mentioned above, the United States Constitution sets a minimum
standard below which protection of individual rights cannot fall. The
Maine Constitution has not only similar but additional constitutional
provisions concerningprotection of individual rights.336
Rational basis scrutiny requires both that a law be based on a
legitimate governmental purpose and that it be reasonably calculated to
further that interest. This section will argue first that, even if the Act is
based on a legitimate governmental purpose,- there is no rational
relationship between the purpose and the Act. Second, I will argue that
the law is not based on a legitimate governmental purpose.
2. The Issue of Rational Relationship Between the Act and a Legiti-
mate Governmental Purpose
Even if the Act is based on a legitimate state purpose, it lacks a
rational relationship to that purpose. The Romer Court wrote "even in
the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of
standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification
adopted and the object to be attained." '337 It went on to state that "[b]y
requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to an
independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications
are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by
the law."38 The State claimed that the rationale for the Amendment was
"respect for other citizens' freedom of association" and "conserving
resources to fight discrimination against other groups." 339 The Court
found that "[t]he breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these
particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them." The
Court found that "[e]ven laws enacted for broad and ambitious purposes
often can be explained by reference to legitimate public policies which
334. The outpouring ofscholarship about Rotneris renarkable. Fora small sample, see, e.g.,
Ann LaguerEstin, When Baehr Mees Rome:: Family Law Issues After Amendment 2, 68 U. CoLO.
L REv. 349 (1997); Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. CowO. L REv. 429,430-32 (1997);
Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romerv. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection,
45 UCLA L REv. 453 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM.
& MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 89 (1997); Barbara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionality of the Defense
of Marriage Act in the Wake ofRomer v. Evans. 32 NEw ENG. L REV. 263 (1997).
335. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
336. Me. Const art. 1, §§ I, 6-A, 24.
337. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
338. Id.




justify the incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons,"t'
but that Amendment 2 was not in that category.
The Maine Act was on its face "enacted for broad and ambitious
purposes," as was Amendment 2. The Act states that it is intended to
"encourage," "nurture," " sustain," "protect," "support," and "strengthen
traditional monogamous Maine families." 42 It must be able to "be
explained by reference to legitimate public policies which justify the
['lincidentall"] disadvantages [it] impose[s] on certain persons."
In this instance, the stated broad public policy of strengthening
traditional monogamous Maine families is effectuated through the direct
disadvantage imposed by the law on gay and lesbian citizens by
excluding them from marriage. This disadvantage is not "incidental";
rather this disadvantage, like Amendment 2, is the whole point of the
legislation.
Yet, excluding gay men and lesbians from marriage does not ease the
burdens on married, opposite-sex Maine couples in any discemable way.
It does not nurture the traditional monogamous Maine family to say that
marriage is only between opposite-gendered people. Declaring other
states' marriages invalid in Maine does not protect the traditional
monogamous Maine family. Conversely, allowing gay and lesbian
couples to marry will not take away any of the rights, responsibilities, or
functions of traditional monogamous married Maine couples. The stated
"public policies" of the Act simply are not related to the actual operation
of the Act. Moreover, the concrete provisions of the Act are so far
removed from the justifications for them (protecting the family and the
other purposes) that the justifications, as in Romer, are implausible.
In Baker v. Vermont, where rational basis scrutiny was applied, the
court rejected many of the State's proffered interests in its prohibition on
same-gender marriage that were rather similar to the purported purposes
of the Act." The court concluded that the "State's interest in preserving
the institution of marriage for no other reason than to preserve a time-
honored institution is invalid,"' "5 and that the State's "proclaimed
interests in uniting men and women to 'bridge their differences' and to
promote a setting which provides both male and female role models are
invalid because they are clearly premised upon improper presumptions
about the roles of men and women."3" The only purported interest that
the court found valid was that in "further[ing] the link between procre-
341. Id. at 1628.
342. Nc. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650 (West 1998).
343. Romerv. Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
344. See Baker v. Vemont, No. S1009-97 (Vt. Super. CL Dec. 19,1997), appeal dockeze4
No. 98-32 (Vt. Jan. 15, 1998). This case involves a challenge to Vermont's marriage laws under
its state constitution, including its public purpose clause. See id.




ation and child rearing" ' This ruling under the Vermont Constitution,
which lacks a specific equal protection clause and other provisions found
in the Maine Constitution, is on appeal.' I believe this conclusion is
incorrect since it is implausible to argue that preventing same-gender
couples from marrying in some way promotes child-rearing by married
parents.34
9
With respect to the Act, the statutory justifications simply are not
related in a rational manner to the actual operation of the Act.
3. The Issue of Legitimate Governmental Purpose
Romer v. Evans analyzed whether the disadvantage imposed by a3.50
statute is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected. Such
animosity, according to the Supreme Court, is not a legitimate state
interest.3"' In the context of Maine's Act, this analysis compels
consideration of the disadvantage imposed by the Act and whether it is
based on animosity toward the class of persons affected.
a. The Exclusion from Marriage
The Act prohibits same-gender couples from marrying in Maine and
prohibits persons legally married out of state according to other states'
laws from being considered married in Maine, as discussed earlier. 2
The concrete exclusions are important, but it does not seem that the Act
was motivated by the concern that the possibility of including same-
gender couples in the benefits and burdens of marriage would somehow
347. Id at 17.
348. Vermont did not amend its marriage statutes when Baehr was decided, so the court was
dealing with a preexisting marriage law.
349. The reasons why I think it is implausible to claim that preventing same-gender couples
from marrying in some way promotes childrearing by married parents include the following: first,
procreation is not essential to marriage and entry into marriage is not in any way tied to the actual
ability or willingness to procreate. See supra notes 209, 214, & 363. Second, the relationship
between protection and childrearing is governed by laws concerning parental rights and
responsibilities, not marriage laws. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 1654 (when parents live
apart, either can file for determination of parental rights and responsibilities), 1653 (standards for
determination of parental rights and responsibilities), 1001 (when court awards divorce it may make
an order determining parental rights and responsibilities). In addition, the presumption of paternity
in marriage does not even apply if the biological evidence suggests the husband is not the father and
can be rebutted in any event. See MR. Evid. 302 (rebuttable presumption of paternity in marriage);
MF. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 1564 (circumstances where presumption does not apply). Thus,
since neither procreation nor parenting is linked by law to opposite sex marriage, it makes little
sense to say that limiting marriage to opposite sex couples furthers any purported link between
procreation and childrearing.
350. See Romer v. Evans, 116S. Ct. at 1628-29.
351. Id.; see also U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973).
352. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(1-A) (West 1998); see also supra Part II.
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make marriage law unworkableJa For example, it would not undermine
the operation of the wrongful death statute to allow same-gender
marriage. It would not make the intestacy statute less workable. It might
even result in greater tax revenues because married couples filing jointly
generally pay more taxes. ' Financial issues were not offered as reasons
for being opposed to same gender marriage by those supporting the Act;
indeed the financial impact of the Act was not discussed at all?'
The importance of marriage has been emphasized by the Law Court;
in Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, the Court stated that "[i]t is the most
important transaction of life. The happiness of those who assume its ties
usually depends upon it more than upon anything else."' '  The state has
a strong interest "in maintaining and preserving the marriage relation,"
and because of that interest, it "virally becomes a third party in all
divorce proceedings."
To fully understand the nature of the disadvantage, it is necessary to
think more fully about marriage and about relationships?"3 To exclude
a group from marriage is to make a negative statement about the
members of that group. For example, during slavery, no Southern state
recognized marriages between slave women and men.-' This was an
important part of maintaining the subordination of the group.3 ° Today,
the right to marry is so taken for granted by heterosexuals and is such a
pervasive part of the culture that it is almost invisible, like the air we
breathe. Yet, imagine a law stating that "residents of Somerset County
shall not be permitted to contract marriage." It would seem remarkably
unfair and irrational, and this highlights the importance of the institution
and the injustice of the exclusion from the institutionP1
The injustice of the exclusion of same-gender couples from marriage
is highlighted by the relaxed legal treatment of marriage by opposite-sex
couples. There are few restrictions on entering marriagePat The exercise
353. Ther was no debate on that issue, and the was no written te smny that involved such
arguments-
354. See Chambers, supra note 15. at 478.
355. No legislator mentioned the financial implications of the Act.
356. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 129 Me. 24,26, 149 A. 573 (1930) (quoting Randall v.
Kreiger, 90 US. (23 Wall.) 137, 147 (1874)).
357. Dionne v. Dionne, 155 Me. 377,378. 156 A.2d 393.394 (1959).
358. See discussion supra Part V.C.
359. See PErERKoLiN, AMERcANSLAvExRs: 1619-1877, 122(1993).
360. See ida Of course, lam not intainin that the situation of gay men and lesbians today
is equivalent to that of slaves.
361. Some might argue that if mariageby same-gender couples is allowed, polygamy must
also be allowed. Professor Mara Strassberg argues that valid grounds for the distinction bct=
polygamy and same-genw rmarriage exist, and that legalization of mtdag by same-,edr cup!:s
is consistent with and critical in maintaining the important tale of nuage in the moden state. See
generally Maua L Strassber& Distinctions of Form or Substance. Monogamy, Poyga= y and
Same-SexMarniage, 75 N.C.L REV. 1501 (1997): see also EwMGE, supra note 48, at 144,148-
49.
362. See discussion supra note 73.
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of the marriage right for opposite-sex couples is not conditioned upon
them procreating or agreeing to procreate. 3 It does not require any
special living arrangement or physical relationship. It is a status that
carries with it important benefits and responsibilities and that is available
by application to people who have no interest in having children or even
living together as well as to people who already have children. People
who are sterile or are long past child bearing age, or who have no interest
in any kind of sexual relationship with each other, are entitled to marry
under Maine's marriage laws. The disadvantage imposed by the Act is
significant, stigmatizing, and central.
b. The Motivation for the Act
It is necessary to consider whether the Act furthers a legitimate state
interest; part of this inquiry is to determine whether the disadvantage
imposed by the Act is born of prejudice and animosity. In this section
I will argue that the disadvantages imposed by the Act are based on
prejudice and animosity toward gay men and lesbians and particularly
toward their possible exercise of rights to marry, and that this is not a
legitimate state purpose. While the Act does not state it is based on
animosity towards gay men and lesbians, it does not have to do so for the
conclusion to be drawn that it is not based on a legitimate state
purpose.3  The Law Court has recognized that government
[d]iscriminatory intent or purpose
may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular
class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence
showing a discriminatory design to favor one individual or class over
another not to be inferred from the action itself.' ... Thus, an
invidious intent to discriminate may be inferred from the totality of
relevant facts.3
7
363. It is noteworthy that once same-gender couples have claimed a right to marry, the
justification for mariage becomes procreation, the one aspect of marriage which gay couples cannot
do with each other. See Baehr v. fIlke, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996). Yet,
prior to same-gender couples claiming the right to marry, there was consensus that marriage was
not defined by consummation or procreation. See supra Part V.C. This in turn suggests that bans
on marriage by same-gender couples are motivated by animus. See supra Part V.F.3; see also
Barbara A. Robb, The Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake of Romer v.
Evans, 32 NEw ENG. L REv. 263,317 (1998).
364. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc, 473 U.S. 432,448-50 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534-38 (1973).
365. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). The amendment in Romer also did not
say that it was based on animosity towards lesbians and gay men. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. at
1620.
366. Aucella v. Town of W'nslow, 583 A.2d 215,216-17 (Me. 1990) (quoting Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)).
367. L at 217 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,241-242 (1976)). For example,
in Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d 72 (Me. 1978), Ace Tire v. Waterville, 302 A.2d 90 (Me. 1973), and
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In this instance, many factors can lead to the conclusion that the Act
is based on animosity. These factors include the exclusion itself,
discussed above, as well as the language of its findings and the circum-
stances of its passage discussed below.
c. The Third Purpose Stated in the Act
The third stated purpose of the statute is "to support and strengthen
traditional monogamous Maine families against improper interference
from out-of-state influences or edicts." As noted above, it was
consistently stated by the sponsors of the initiative petition that the "out-
of-state influence or edict' which may "improperly influence" Maine
families is the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin.
The intent behind this provision is to avoid the influence of the Baehr
decision and other out-of-state court decisions, and thus to prevent gay
men and lesbians from marrying.' The language seeks to protect
certain Maine families (the traditional, monogamous ones) from "out-of-
state influences or edicts:"  This loaded, xenophobic language is
surprising in a federalist system, because it does not reflect a vision of
the United States as one nation. Its tone implies that there is something
sinister about out-of-state influences, which may be indicative of bias
and animosity. In examining other recent statutes on same-gender
marriage I have found no such language. The goal of protecting Maine
families from "improper interference from out-of-state influences or
edicts" is of dubious legitimacy in our federalist system.'
McNidholasv. York Beach Vilage Corp., 394 A.2d 264 (Me. 1978). the Law Court did not reuire
a showing of discriminatory intent to show that the cLassifications ve unsatis faory.
368. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650(2)(C) (West 1998).
369. See supra note 78.
370. "This situation is thus vey diMrnt from that fa&cd by the Law Court in Sobmitz v. Mafne
Sch. Admin. Dist. Nwnber 59, 495 A.2d 812 (Me. 1985), where school officials cancelled a
Tolerance Day program at which openly lesbian Dale McCormick was to speak. School officials
testified that the reason they did so was to prevent disruption of education that might happen if
community threats of sabotage itre caried out. See id. at 818. Tle plainf asked th Law Court
to find that the officials' actual motive was the same as that of the citizens who lobbied them in
opposition to having a homosexual speak at school See id. The Law Court accepted the trial
court's conclusion that the actual cancellation reason was that testified to by the officials. See id.
In this instance, the drafters of the law were very dear what "out-of-state edicts" meant. and the
legislature passed the identical law. Without contrary legislative history, it is clear that hostility to
the Hawaii decision and other such decisions is the actual meaning of the third purpos of the
statute.
371. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650(2)(C) (West 1998) (emphasis adde). The
phrase "monogamous family" is puzzling because normally "monogamy" refers to a couple's
relationship, not a family.
372. See genera!y Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618 (1969); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55 (1982). The other findings and purposes, although less explicit. ar not actually prumoted by
the Act. so they may safely be discarded. In addition, !he references to "out-of-state" edicts have
overtones of state-imposed orthodoxy. wich is incompatible with the Fast Am dment. Cf. West
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d. The Context, History, and Origins of the Act
The Act, as described earlier, originated as an initiative petition to
inoculate the state against Baehr v. LewinYn After an emotional hearing
before the Judiciary Committee,374 a majority of the Committee voted
"Ought to Pass" and added a Committee Amendment consisting of a
fiscal note stating that if the bill is enacted it will have no fiscal impact,
but if it has to go out to referendum the estimated cost to the Secretary
of State is $95,000. 7-1 Written testimony at the hearing included
statements by a range of religious leaders and others in favor of the
bill," 6 while others argued against it.3'
Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1942) ("if them is any fixed star in our
constellation, it is that no official... can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion or other matters of opinion"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("the
State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of
available knowledge").
373. See supra notes 5 and 78; Paul Carrier, Maine Group Seeks to Ban Gay Wedlock,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 2,1996, at Al.
374. Paul Carrier, Speakers Clash Over Gay Marriage Issue. Maine Lawmakers Hear
Passionate Debate about the Effect of Same-Sex Marriage and the Family, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Mar. 13,1997 atAl.
375. See Comm. Amend. A to LD. 1017, No. H-104 (118th Legis. 1997).
376. Pastor Rick Stoops of the First United Pentecostal Church of Augusta submitted written
testimony quoting from Romans 1:18-32 and stating, "I know that the wording in the Bible is direct
and candid concerning the act of homosexuality, however, remember, this is the Word of God and
not just an opinion." He further asked the Legislature to "allowol the Bible to guide your decision
on the subject at hand." Paul B. Madore's written testimony rhetorically asked, "Can anyone hem
today convince me that same sex marriage will contribute to our society in a positive way and not
bring it to the fulfillment of what can only be termed as 'the homosexualization of our culture?' I
don't think so!" He went on to note that "allowing Same Sex Marriage will only serve to condone
and codify this distorted ideology and condition that homosexuality promotes." He then quoted
from Ezekiel and remarked, "You legislators present here today, elected in most cases by a vast
majority of Maine citizens within your district have been entnisted by them, from a Christian
perspective, to be this voice [referred to in Ezekiel, dissuading the wicked man from his way]."
Christopher Ring's testimony stated, "From my bible I can definitely say that Jesus Christ would
not allow Same Sex marriage at any time or anywhere on earth." Harvey Lord reminded legislators
that "this nation was founded upon Judeo-Christian principles" and urged legislators to "consider
the strong and repeated condemnation of homosexual behavior that is in the Bible... [M/e must
certainly speak out against any proposed legal recognition of the unnatural, unhealthy, perverse
behavior which has, among other things, been the primary cause of an awesome and deadly disease
known as A.LD.S." Rev. David Lang of the Northern New England District Council of the
Assemblies of God wrote, "as our culture embraces unnatural, unbiblical lifestyles the family suffers
... we believe the law of Maine ought to uphold this God-ordained and time-honored tradition."
Rev. Donald R. Miller of Emmanual Reformed Presbyterian Church wrote that
marriage is not the product of an ever-changing evolutionary process. No group's
notions that they are a minority deserving of special treatment, that homosexuality is
normal and healthy, and that they are like everyone else, have any merit or any relevance
whatsoever. Marriage was instituted by God Himself and is not subject to alteration.
Carolyn Cosby, Chairman of Concerned Maine Families, wrote
today the issue before you is same-sex marriage, but I say to you that the demand by gay
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Many legislators in debate mentioned that the Act was based on
bigotry and discrimination against lesbians and gay menYP Several
militants in this country for legalized homosexual unions can be Ik to the
magician's skillful hand waving a red scarf for the purpose of diverting the public's
attention away from the real action: in this case, seizing the long sought-after goal of
gaining special "minority" status. Whtheritbe"arital" status or"sexual orientation"
stams-he- goal of the gay militants for the past 30 ears has not change&i to utlz any
means to qualify for the status and benefits of special minority status by falsely
portraying themselves as an oppressed minority in America contrary to the
overwhelming evidence of their power and welh.
377. Written testimony included the following: PeterMcer, minster of a United Church
of Christ parish in Saco, and a member of the Religious Coalition Against Discrimination, stad:-
I consider myself a biblical Christian and need to emphasize that I encounter the es=ee
of the biblical faith very diffcrently from most making a 'Christin' case for this bill.
I hear the gospel including those who have religiously and socially been defined out to
the margins, challenging those who are moralistically restrictive, and encouraging those
who would claim their authentic God-given creation. The qualities which make for a
healthy supportive household have nothing to do with heterosexual or homo=al and
evything to do with mutual loving commitment to the care, growth, and well-bemg of
each person...
Anne Underwood of the Religious Coalition Against Discrimination wrote of her concern about
the so-called "religious position" on who may enter a marriage covenant. There is not
"a" definitive position based on Hebrew or Christian scripture and tradition. There is
sincere, reasoned d within and among denominations anid faith communities
regarding the moral contours of marriage. .. I believe it is contrary to the founding
principles of our nation, to allow one particular reading of Hebrew or Chistian scriptr,
or one version of "religious tradition" to dictate to this legislature the contours of
"morality." . .. Many pople of faith believe that our scriptures and tradition call us to
honor a covenant of marriage between any two adult persons who profess their love,
fidelity and commitment each to the other.
Rabbi Paul Cohen of Congregation Bet Ha'am wrote, "the stamp of the divinc is found in the souls
of all God's children-gay, lesbian and straight. The love that God calls us to, the love that binds
two people in a loving and devoted commitment, is accessible to all God's children. ... This
legislation betrays those values." Rev. Mark Worth, a Unitarian Universalist minister, vote that
the bill was "anti-marriage" and that his denomination "encourages ministers to perform sam-
gender marriages, and has voted in our national General Assembly last June to endome the
legalization of such marriages." Rev. Marvin Ellison, Professor of Christian Ethics at Bangor
Theological Seminary, stated, "As a minister, I trust that love is love, no matter where ithappen
In a si n-la way, marriage is marriage, no mate the gender of the partns" Rev. e=r Mercer,
a United Church of Christ Mnister, wrote that "there am some among us whto would say that Jesus
condemned those who loved people of the same s. The truth is he m er speaks about
homosexuality. He speaks about love between and among persons... I am a woman who knoas
that to exclude gay and lesbian people from the institution of marriage is a comp!etely UN-Christian
act. It contradicts cveqything Jesus modeled about love and community."
378. See, eg., Legis. Rec. H-330 (1997) (statementof Rep. Powrs) (asserting: "ibis bill is
loaded with moralistic language and cultural bias. I think this has occurred because when it comes
to referencing homosexuality there is enormous fear stirred up, both of sexuality and of
difference."); see id. at H-332 (statement of Rep. Bull) (declaring: "We are singling out a sector
of society for discrimination with this act."); see id. at H-330 (statement of Rep. Watson)
(proclaiming:. "I can never support legislation that intends to single out and blatantly discriminate
against any group of people based on a religious prejudice, in my view."); see hL at H-331
(statement of Rep. Dunlap) (arguing: "(The bill] is not a stand for morality, it is the very mask of
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mentioned,that they thought the bill might be unconstitutional. 9 With
one exception," all those legislators who spoke in the debate, who
ultimately voted for the Act, stated that they feared the consequences of
a divisive referendum should they defeat the Act. 81 No legislator
claimed that the Act actually would fulfill its stated purposes; i.e., no one
claimed that the bill would strengthen traditional Maine families.
Governor King let the bill become law without his signature."e
The circumstances of the Act's passage described above show that
something may be amiss with the political process that led to its passage.
Reasoned legislative debate on the legislation and its implications did not
take place.383 There are indicia that illegitimate state interests may be
bigotry."); Legis. Rec. S-392 (1997) (statement of Sen. Longley) (stating "I believe this citizen
referendum is filled with fear, ignorance, bigotry and smear."); see id, at S-396 (statement of Sen.
Cathcart) (declaring: "I don't see that rm threatened, or my marriage is threatened, by any gay
people or lesbian couples who are wanting to be married."); see id. at S-394 (statement of Sen.
Abromson) (proclaiming: "This bill is mean-spirited, it's homophobic, it's intrusive.").
379. See Legis. Rec. H-332 (1997) (statement of Rep. Jones) (arguing: "To say [same-sex
marriage] is illegal violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution in the
Fourteenth Amendment. It also violates 6A of the Maine Constitution."); see id. (statement of Rep.
Brennan) (stating:. "I hope that all of us can look back in five years or 10 years and see that we
voted for something that is probably unconstitutional, unnecessary and almost certainly
discriminatory.); Legis. Rec. S-394 (statement of Sen. Abromson) (asserting: "I believe that this
bill, if challenged under the 'Full Faith and Credit' clause of the U.S. Constitution, might well be
deemed to be unconstitutional. ... I shall pray for its being declared null and void by the third
branch of governmeat."); see id. (statement of Sen. Cleveland) (declaring: "I as well. share the
opinion that it may well be unconstitutionaL").
380. Rep. Vedral stated that two persons of the same gender or "two elderly people who
decide to spend the remainder of their life [sic] together" should not be allowed to marry but
"should have the same protections as the rest of us," supporting the idea of legislation extending
protections to such relationships. Legis. Rec. H-332 (1997).
381. Rep. Cowger made the following statement: "I will reluctantly be voting in support of
the prevailing motion in order to avoid this issue going out to a divisive state-wide referendum."
lI& at H-331; H-33, Rep. Barth stated, "My personal feeling is if we [sic] avoid a costly and divisive
referendum which will give Maine a bigger black eye than the mere passage of this tonight" Id.
at H-333; Rep. Meres opined, "My personal feeling is that this bill should not be here, period." Id
Rep. Meres noted the negative consequences of a referendum, and promised to work on an
alternative bill to "protect the rights of alL" lIL Sen. Abromson stated that "defeat [of LD. 1017]
could mark the beginning of a long, expensive, hate-filled referendum campaign.... I wish to
avoid that" I&. at S-394. Sen. Benoittestified, "I don't want to send it out torefendum.... [A]t
the hearing, people came in with their bibles on both sides of the issue with a lot of passion, and I
can just picture a summer of conflict that we don't need." Id
382. See Nancy Perry, King Won't Sign Bill to Ban Same-Sex Marriages, PoRTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Apr. 1,1997, at Al. Governor King apparently also expressed the view that the Act was
unconstitutional. See Bill Nemitz, King's Stand Spoils Cosby's Celebration, PORTAND PRESS
HEtALD, Apr. 2,1997. -
383. For example, as I have pointed out, the Act in theory broadens Maine's nonrecognition
of legally performed out-of-state mariages. Maine already had an evasion statute to deal with
situations where couples married out of state to avoid state law. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 19-A,
§ 701(1) (West 1998). The Act makes a potentially significant change in the state's policy about
recognizing other states' marriage laws, yet leaves the evasion law on the books. The evasion law
will no longer have any meaning since any violations of the Act's provision about out-of-state
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behind the legislation, as discussed in Cleburne,' Ronwr,3" and
Moreno s6 Indeed, considering all of the circumstances, it appears that
the Act is based on the plainly illegitimate "desire to harm a politically
unpopular group.: 3
4. Conclusion
The Act's prohibition on gay men and lesbians from having the
responsibilities and rights of marriage does not further any "independent
and legitimate legislative end!' as is required to satisfy even deferential
rational basis scrutiny. Rather, the Act furthers the desire to harm a
politically unpopular group. In addition, the means chosen by the Act
bear no rational relationship with any possible legitimate state interest.
This type of legislative targeting should be particularly questionable
given Maine's constitutional protections for civil rights, natural rights,
and against discrimination.389
rnais seeid § 701(1-A), will also be a violation of the evasion statute. See Id. There %Ms no
discussion of any of these implications.
384. 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
385. 116 S. C. 1620, 1627-28 (1996).
386. 413 U.S. 528,534-35 (1973). In this context, the question inevitably arises as to the
significance of Bowers v. Hardwick 478 US. 186 (1986). as it relates to Romer v. Evan. In
Bowers, the Supreme Court upheld agamst a due process challenge Georgia's criminal sodomy law
outlawing private; adult, consensual sex betwcen persons of the same sex. Th court defined the
question as whether there was a right for adults to engage in homosexual sodomy and found that
there was no such right rather than recognizing that its prior privacy cases dealt with broad issues
of humanity, like dignity and autonomy. See id. at 190-92. For a sample of scholarship, = Anne
B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden
Determinants ofBowers v. Hardwick. 97 YALE LJ. 1073 (1988); Brett . Wdliamson, Note, 7he
Consduional Privacy Doctrine After Bowers v. Hardwick. Rethining the Second Death of
Substntve Due Process, 62 S.CALLREV. 1297 (1989); see also, TRE, supra note 88. at 1430-
31. The decision in Bowers was five-to-four, with Justice Powell providing the swing vote in favor
ofthestate. After retiring, Justice Powell stated that he regretted his vote in that cas.. SeeRuth
Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASIL PosT, Oct. 26,1990. at A3. In 1996, thz
Court decided Romer on equal protection grounds, as noted abo-e, not cven mentioning Bowers.
which was decided on due process grounds. Scalia, in dissent, claimed that the majority was
overruling Bowers without saying so; some have agreed with that assessment. See, e.g., Robb,
supra note 363, at 330-31. As noted above, Romer's inquiry into intent casts doubt on all statutes
based on anti-gay animus. But see Andrew Koppelmnan, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6
WM. & MARY B.L RTs. J. 89 (1997). Even if not overruled by Romer, it has been persuasively
argued that Bowers does norhave negative implications for sexual orientation claims that are d
on equal protection rather than due process. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the
Consti" ion:A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection. 55 U. CHL
L.REV. 1161 (1988). This analysis was adopted inAble v. UnitedStates, 968 F. Supp. 850 (1997).
387. See Romerv. Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1628; U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 US. at
534.
388. Romerv. Evans, 116 S. C. at 1628.
389. SeeMe. Const.ar ., §§ , 6A,24.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Marriage is a centrally important institution in civil society, which
may account for the passionate battles about its meaning that erupt
periodically in this country. It is also an institution which has undergone
radical changes in the past one hundred and fifty years. The nationwide,
and indeed worldwide, quest of gay men and lesbians to take on the
responsibilities and rights of marriage has met with a severe backlash,
manifested in Maine in the "Act to Protect Traditional Marriage and
Prohibit Same-Sex Marriages."
The essence of the Act is to exclude gay men and lesbians from
marrying. However, all laws must have a legitimate justification. This
one does not appear to have such a justification. As I have argued, the
Act classifies on the basis of gender, burdens the fundamental right to
marry, and classifies on the basis of sexual orientation. Thus, the Act
must be based on a sufficiently important state interest and must be
narrowly tailored to further only that interest or substantially related to
furtherance of that interest. The Act is not based on an articulable,
sufficiently important or compelling state interest and is not sufficiently
closely related to furtherance of that interest.
Moreover, the legal landscape regarding classifications based on
sexual orientation arguably has changed since Romer v. Evans. No
longer should prejudice against or animosity towards gay people
constitute a legitimate state interest. The Act's explicit goal of avoiding
"out-of-state influences' '390 betrays its impropriety in a federalist system.
Broad bans must be justified by specific policies and must be tailored
towards articulable goals. As I have argued in this Article, the Act does
not further its stated purposes. It does not help or protect married
couples in any discernable manner. And it is not based on a legitimate
state interest.
Maine's Constitution contains uniquely broad language protecting
civil rights and forbidding discrimination in the exercise of civil rights.39'
The Law Court has not specifically interpreted this language. The Maine
Constitution also contains an explicit equal protection clause and a
natural rights clause. These constitutional provisions provide a textual
basis for a jurisprudence that may be. more protective of individual rights
than federal jurisprudence has been. The Act may provide a good
starting place for the Law Court to put those tools to use.
The same policies that support marriage, such as promoting stable
families and supporting couples' commitments to each other, support
recognition of marriages by same-gender-couples. 3" The same policies
390. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650(2)(C) (West 1998).
391. See Me. Const. art. , § 6-A.
392. See Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundationsfora Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking
Beyond Political Liberalism 85 GEO. LJ. 1871, 1934-42 (1997) (emphasizing normative value of
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that support restricting governmental intrusions on the decision to marry,
such as respect for individuals' intimate decisions and autonomy, support
striking down, or repealing, the restrictions contained in the Actl?
same-sex relationships and arguing that gay men and lesbians must be allowed to marry as a V-y
of gaining actual personal autonomy).
393. See id.
1998] 403

